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Abstract: 
There is a fundamental dichotomy in immigration law.  On one hand, courts have 
consistently maintained that Congress has “plenary power” over immigration and reject 
most constitutional challenges on that basis.  On the other hand, courts frequently use 
canons of statutory construction in an aggressive fashion to help interpret immigration 
statutes in favor of aliens.  Immigration scholars have almost exclusively focused on the 
plenary power doctrine.  They have either ignored the important role that canons have 
played in immigration law or have viewed canons as serving only a temporary and 
marginally legitimate role as substitutes for the lack of constitutional rights afforded 
aliens.  In this Article, I defend canons and argue that they should be viewed as having a 
permanent and legitimate role in interpreting immigration provisions, even in cases where 
no constitutional issues are raised.  I explain that part of the function of some canons is to 
require courts to sometimes adopt second-best interpretations of statutes.  Contrary to the 
claims of some scholars, these interpretations do not add unpredictability to the law.  
While I defend the canons that courts have chosen to apply in immigration cases on 
normative grounds, the Court’s recent application of the canon of constitutional 
avoidance presents new concerns.  The Court has recently transformed the canon, which 
requires courts to avoid serious constitutional issues through statutory interpretations, 
into a device that often gives aliens as a whole greater rights, at least temporarily, than 
would a decision that rested on constitutional grounds.  The expansion of the canon of 
constitutional avoidance means that courts should be particularly careful when applying it 
in order to avoid unnecessarily disrupting Congress’s legislative designs. 
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 Interest in United States immigration law is arguably at an all time high, with the 
public discussing the fate of the undocumented in our society and immigration scholars 
opining on academically popular topics like the constitutional rights of aliens or the 
appropriateness of the government using immigration provisions to help fight terrorism.1
Not many, however, are discussing the common judicial practice of using canons of 
statutory construction to interpret important immigration statutes in favor of aliens.2 The 
Supreme Court is an enthusiastic supporter of these canons, as are lower courts.  Indeed, 
 
1 "Alien" is a legal term under United States immigration laws, and it refers to any individual with alien 
status in the United States.  8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006) (definitions).  The term is considered by many to be 
pejorative.  Case law and scholarly articles, which must be quoted in this Article, refer extensively to 
"alien" and "alienage," however.  In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, the term will be used in this 
Article. 
2 It is obviously not surprising that the general public does not discuss canons, but academics have no 
excuse. 
3at times the Court seems to go out of its way to assert the relevance of canons in 
interpreting statutes.3 Taking the Court’s cue, this Article makes a long overdue defense 
of the role of canons of statutory construction in immigration law.        
 A large part of immigration scholarship has been focused on the goal of ensuring 
that aliens are treated fairly by the government.4 One major barrier to this effort has been 
Congress’s “plenary power” over immigration and the concomitant lack of constitutional 
protections enjoyed by aliens.  Typically, although Congress’s legislative power over 
many areas (e.g., patents, interstate commerce) is described by courts as “plenary,” it is 
still subject to normal constitutional limitations.5 In contrast, courts have traditionally 
considered the power of the federal government over immigration to be nearly unlimited 
and the constitutional rights of immigrants to be extremely limited—in many cases, 
virtually nonexistent.6
In creating the plenary power doctrine in the late nineteenth century, the Court 
relied heavily on policy, reasoning that the United States' existence as a sovereign state 
should give it unfettered power to control immigration.7 Statutory interpretation in 
 
3 See, e.g., Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 n.2 (2001) (stating “it remains instructive that the 
Government acknowledges that background principles of statutory construction and constitutional concerns 
must be considered in determining the scope of IIRIRA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions”). 
4 As used in this Article, the term “immigration law” refers to the law governing the admission and 
expulsion of aliens, rather than on the more general law of aliens’ rights and obligations, such as their tax 
status and eligibility for government benefits and employment.  See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law 
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE 
L. J. 545, 547 (1990). 
5 See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the 
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
6 See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.          
7 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 708 (1893) (asserting that the power to deport is “an 
inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its 
independence and its welfare”).  See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the 
Constitution, 83 Am. J. INT’L L. 862, 863 (1989) (stating that “the Court did not start with the text or 
structure of the Constitution and ask how a power to regulate immigration might be inferred.  Rather, it 
approached the question of congressional power from the perspective of the conduct of foreign affairs.”).  
This is not to suggest that the Court’s creation of the plenary power doctrine rested on sound principles.  
See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND 
4immigration law, however, often employs a very different set of policy objectives.  In 
contrast to the extreme deference they typically give Congress when considering, and 
usually rejecting, constitutional challenges to statutes, courts frequently interpret 
immigration statutes against the government, and often do so for policy reasons.  When 
interpreting statutes, courts regularly apply “substantive” canons of statutory 
construction, which are policy based directives about how a lack of statutory clarity 
should be resolved.8 These canons are underpinned by different, and quite varied, 
policies supporting their application, but they almost always direct courts to interpret 
statutes in favor of aliens and therefore help to ensure that aliens are treated fairly by the 
government.9 Indeed, in many cases there is more than one applicable canon directing 
the court to construe the statute in favor of the alien.10 
Possibly the most controversial of these canons is the canon of constitutional 
avoidance (“avoidance canon”), which requires a court to adopt a plausible—but not 
necessarily the most persuasive—interpretation of a statute in order to avoid serious 
 
AMERICA 195 (1987) (arguing that the Court erroneously developed the plenary power doctrine by relying 
on cases that concerned only the federalism question of whether Congress, as opposed to states, could 
exclude aliens at all). 
8 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES 
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 634 (2d ed. 1995).  Substantive canons are also sometimes referred 
to as “normative canons,” among other terms.  See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and 
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L. J. 479, 507 (1998).  
In contrast to substantive canons, “textual canons” “set forth inferences that are usually drawn from the 
drafter’s choice of words, their grammatical placement in sentences, and their relationship to other parts of 
the ‘whole’ statute.”  See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY at 634.  The Court also applies textual canons in 
immigration cases, and these canons can influence the Court’s interpretation of statutes.  See, e.g., Jama v. 
ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 343 (2005) (applying “the grammatical ‘rule of the last antecedent’”) (citation omitted). 
9 Interpreting an immigration statute in accordance with a substantive canon usually, but not always, 
benefits the alien.  One case where a canon did not benefit the alien was Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), where the Court applied the presumption that acts of Congress do not have 
extraterritorial application unless such intent is clearly manifested in support of its statutory holding that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act did not apply to actions taken by the Coast Guard on high seas.  See id. at 
173-74.   
10 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 298-300 (2001) (mentioning the avoidance canon, the 
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and the rule requiring a clear statement of 
congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction).     
5constitutional issues.11 Courts have frequently used this canon in immigration cases, 
often in what can be described as an aggressive fashion.12 Although the avoidance canon 
has been defended by the Court on the theory that application of it is an exercise in 
judicial restraint, it is targeted by critics as evidence of judicial activism.13 In a highly 
influential article written in 1990, Professor Motomura argued that the Court has used the 
avoidance canon in an improper manner in immigration cases by avoiding constitutional 
issues that were not serious and engaging in questionable statutory interpretations.14 In a 
recent immigration case, Clark v. Martinez,15 the Court added a new and powerful aspect 
to the avoidance canon by holding that a statutory interpretation adopted by invoking the 
avoidance canon must be uniformly applied in subsequent cases, even if the subsequent 
cases do not raise any constitutional issues.16 The end result of this concept, the “lowest 
common denominator” principle, can be greater rights for aliens as a whole, at least 
temporarily, than if the statutory provision had been struck down on constitutional 
grounds.17 
Although it is controversial and worthy of (extensive) discussion, focusing solely 
on the avoidance canon inaccurately suggests that the canons used in immigration cases 
only concern constitutional interests.  To the contrary, courts often apply canons in 
immigration cases in order to promote non-constitutional interests.  One notable example 
is the immigration rule of lenity, which directs courts to interpret ambiguous statutory 
provisions in favor of the alien regardless of whether the case involves constitutional 
 
11 See infra Part I.B. (describing the avoidance canon). 
12 See Motomura, supra note 4, at 565-75 (describing immigration cases where the canon has been applied). 
13 See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text (explaining how the Court views application of the canon 
as a means of giving effect to congressional intent). 
14 See generally Motomura, supra note 4. 
15 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
16 See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. 
6issues.18 Another canon that is applied without regard to constitutional issues is the 
presumption against retroactivity, which has been particularly relevant in immigration 
law in recent years due to Congress’s penchant for enacting statutes with possible 
retroactive effects.  This canon directs courts to give statutes only prospective effect 
unless the statute clearly provides that it should have retroactive effect.19 Other canons, 
such as the canon requiring that federal statutes be construed, where reasonably possible, 
not to conflict with international law, are also applied regardless of constitutional 
issues.20 
Over the last couple of decades, possibly due in part to the increasing importance 
of statutes as a source of law, there has been a renewed interest generally among scholars 
and courts in statutory interpretation theory and canons of statutory construction.21 
Despite this increased interest, and the liberal use of canons by courts in immigration 
cases, statutory interpretation issues have not captured the attention of immigration 
scholars in the same way as has the plenary power doctrine.22 Perhaps the most notable 
exception to this disinterest amongst immigration scholars was Professor Motomura’s 
influential article in which he examined the relationship between the plenary power 
 
17 See infra Part IV.A. 
18 See infra Part I.A.1. (describing the immigration rule of lenity). 
19 See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (describing the presumption against retroactivity). 
20 See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
21 See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, A More Modest Proposal than a Common Law for the Age of Statutes: 
Greater Reliance in Statutory Interpretation on the Concept of Interpretive Intention, 68 ALB. L. REV. 949 
(2005) (discussing the “statutorification” of American law); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the 
Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 256 (1992) (stating that 
judges are now “debating statutory interpretation methodologies at a level of theory that far transcends the 
details of the case at hand, and that implicates the very question of the [judiciary’s] role in a democracy”). 
22 The number of articles discussing the plenary power doctrine is staggering.  The following are some 
well-known examples.  See, e.g., Louis H. Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A 
Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Peter H. Schuck, The 
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration 
Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
7doctrine and how courts have interpreted immigration statutes.23 Professor Motomura 
argued that in the past courts applied the avoidance canon in an improper manner by 
using two sets of inconsistent constitutional rules in immigration cases.24 One set of 
rules, usually mainstream constitutional rules favorable to aliens, were considered when 
courts interpreted statutes to avoid constitutional issues.  When courts were subsequently 
forced to decide constitutional issues directly, however, they used a different set of rules, 
usually based on the plenary power doctrine, that were unfavorable to aliens.  Professor 
Motomura argued that the second set of rules revealed the first set to be “phantom 
constitutional norms.”25 The end result in Professor Motomura’s view was that the 
avoidance canon was used by courts to engage in questionable statutory interpretations 
that indirectly undermined the plenary power doctrine.26 
Professor Motomura’s solution to the problem he described was for courts to 
abandon the plenary power doctrine and apply mainstream constitutional rules in all 
immigration cases.27 He believed that the Court’s phantom norm decisions were part of a 
transitional phase and argued that “as judges become more willing to address 
constitutional issues directly, rather than through statutory decisions, they should find 
that they do not need to grope for these awkward and unpredictable statutory 
decisions.”28 Thus, in Professor Motomura’s view, once the transition was complete, 
courts would no longer have the same need to apply the avoidance canon or the 
 
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1362, 1386-96 (1953).   
23 See Motomura, supra note 4. 
24 See id. at 549 (stating that “[t]he constitutional norms that courts use when they directly decide 
constitutional issues in immigration cases are not the same constitutional norms that inform interpretation 
of immigration statutes”). 
25 See id. at 564-75 (describing and illustrating the phantom norms theory). 
26 See id. at 549. 
27 See id. at 612. 
8immigration rule of lenity, which he viewed as a canon that was similarly designed to 
express constitutional values.29 
This Article attempts to fill a void in immigration scholarship by reevaluating and 
defending the legitimacy and role of canons in immigration law.  In part, this Article 
responds to long-standing notions that canons serve primarily as short-term solutions to 
the problem of the plenary power doctrine and that they add unpredictability to the law.  
This Article also addresses important new issues that significantly affect how canons 
should be viewed, such as the weakening of the plenary power doctrine and the lowest 
common denominator principle.  While this Article defends the role of canons in 
immigration law, doing so does not imply that the plenary power doctrine should not be 
abandoned or that the constitutional rights of aliens are unimportant.  The elimination of 
the plenary power doctrine would be a welcome development in immigration law.  But 
the role of the plenary power doctrine has been thoroughly examined.  The same cannot 
be said about canons.  Considering the importance of canons in immigration law, it is 
time for this oversight to be corrected. 
 This Article has five parts.  Part I describes why the role of canons in immigration 
law is a permanent one that is not tied to the existence of the plenary power doctrine.  
Part II explains that the problem of judicial overutilization of canons should not be 
confused with the legitimate role of canons in requiring courts to sometimes adopt 
second-best interpretations of statutes.  This Part argues that these second-best 
interpretations, even if sometimes rather aggressive, do not add unpredictability to the 
 
28 Id. at 602.          
29 See id. at 600-01.  I do not mean to suggest that Professor Motomura disagreed in his article with the 
avoidance canon in general.  Indeed, he stated that “[t]here is nothing wrong with borrowing constitutional 
9law.  Part III explains that due to the decline of the plenary power doctrine, courts now 
have more opportunities to legitimately apply the avoidance canon without relying on 
“phantom” constitutional norms.   
 Part IV explains how the new lowest common denominator principle has 
transformed the avoidance canon into a device that can give aliens as a whole greater 
rights, at least temporarily, than a decision that rested on constitutional grounds.  This 
Part argues that while this new development should caution courts to carefully apply the 
avoidance canon, its influence should not be exaggerated.  In many immigration cases 
there is a second canon, in addition to the avoidance canon, that would require a uniform 
interpretation even without the assistance of the lowest common denominator principle.  
Finally, Part V defends the canons that courts have chosen to apply in immigration cases.  
An immigration rule of severity, for example, might more accurately enact congressional 
intent than the immigration rule of lenity.  Nevertheless, the Court’s choice to apply the 
immigration rule of lenity, as well as other canons, rests on sound public policy, which 
courts have historically had the discretion to promote. 
I. The Permanent Status of Canons of Statutory Construction in 
 Immigration Law   
 
Canons of statutory construction are important in immigration law.  Judicial 
interpretations of immigration statutes often favor aliens, and canons have played an 
important role in these interpretations.30 Despite the fact that canons typically instruct 
 
norms to interpret statutes.”  Id. at 564.  He did, however, urge courts to decide constitutional issues 
directly rather than apply the avoidance canon and decide cases on statutory grounds.  See id. at 612-13.   
30 Because substantive canons almost always direct courts to interpret statutes in favor of aliens, Karl 
Llewellyn’s famous critique of canons where he argued that for every canon pointing in one direction 
("thrusts") there is another canon pointing in the opposite direction ("parries") is not relevant to 
immigration law, at least as regards substantive canons.  See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of 
Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV.
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courts to interpret immigration statutes in favor of aliens, in theory the canons should 
have a somewhat limited role in the interpretation of statutes.  Even the strongest canon is 
only applicable when a statute is less than “clear,” however that term is defined.31 
Because they recognize that it is Congress that has the legislative power, courts generally 
purport to act as the “faithful agents” of Congress and interpret statutes in a way that is 
consistent with congressional intent.32 Thus, if a court believes that the meaning of a 
statute is clear, that Congress has adequately expressed its intent, the court will interpret 
the statute accordingly.     
 In reality, canons often play a significant role in the interpretation of statutes.  
While courts may consider themselves bound by congressional intent, identifying 
congressional intent regarding the meaning of a specific provision is not always easy, or 
 
395, 398-404 (1950).  One frequent complication to canons resolving statutory uncertainty in favor of the 
alien, however, is the Chevron doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which requires that courts 
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes for which the agency has authority to 
administer.  In many immigration cases courts have to deal with both the Chevron doctrine, which favors 
the government if applicable, and canons, which typically favor the alien.  In an earlier article, I discussed 
the conflict between the Chevron doctrine and the immigration rule of lenity.  See Brian G. Slocum, The 
Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 515 (2003).   
31 The trigger for any substantive canon is something less than statutory clarity, but canons are not all 
triggered by the same level of uncertainty.  Clear statement canons, for example, are triggered by less 
statutory ambiguity than are tie-breaker canons.  See Slocum, supra note 30, at 544-46.  While this 
distinction is valid theoretically, courts have not been precise about what constitutes ambiguity.  See Caleb 
Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 396 (2005) (wondering “[h]ow big a gap must exist 
between the leading interpretation and the next most likely alternative for the Court to say that the statute 
permits only one construction”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 520 (noting the uncertainty in determining how much ambiguity is necessary 
before a statute is deemed to be ambiguous).        
32 See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2005).  I refer to intent 
in a broad, generic sense.  All statutory interpretation philosophies seek in some sense, at least in part, to 
enact congressional intent.  Even textualists seek to enact congressional intent, although the textualists 
disagree with intent based philosophies about how congressional intent should be defined and how 
statutory interpretation should seek to enact it.  See id. at 422-43l; Nelson, supra note 31, at 353 
(“Textualists and intentionalists alike give every indication of caring both about the meaning intended by 
the enacting legislature and about the need for readers to have fair notice of that meaning, as well as about 
some additional policy-oriented goals.”); Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central 
Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L. J. 427 (2005).   
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even possible.33 The statutes enacted by Congress are often vague or ambiguous because 
Congress is unable and unwilling to address every important question that might arise 
under its statutes and sometimes legislates with deliberate ambiguity.34 Thus, the 
application of canons of some type is inevitable.35 
Most immigration scholars have failed to appreciate the important role of canons 
described above in helping to resolve inherent statutory uncertainty in a way that is 
beneficial to aliens.  In addition, the academy’s fascination with the plenary power 
doctrine has caused its view of canons to be distorted in two important and related ways.  
One distortion is the assumption that canons are primarily intended by courts to 
compensate for the lack of constitutional rights enjoyed by aliens and that these canons 
must therefore serve only to protect constitutional interests.36 Professor Motomura, for 
example, criticizes the immigration rule of lenity as an “awkward way to express a 
phantom constitutional norm” and asserts that it is an example of “overbroad 
 
33 See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation,
108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 603 (1995) (discussing the idea that “statutory meaning is necessarily created both 
by interpretation and by legislation ”); Jarry L. Marshaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the 
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827 (1991) (stating that “attempts to link the 
interpretation of statutes to the commands of an identifiable legislature are doomed”). 
34 See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional 
Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2002) (“There is 
simply too much law today, governing too many subjects, for legislators to address every important policy 
question that might arise under their statutes.”); ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 8, at 730-31 (stating that 
Congress deliberately passes vague and ambiguous statutes which delegates to courts the power to "fill in 
all the gaps" by way of a "common law" approach).  
35 See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 640 (1999) 
("It is hard to find anyone who believes that canons of construction have no legitimate place in 
interpretation."). 
36 See, e.g., David A. Martin, Major Issues in Immigration Law, 1987 WL 123658, *9 (F.J.C.) (stating that 
the Supreme Court fashioned “a more interventionist rule of construction” “[a]lmost as if to compensate for 
this constitutional deference”).  I agree that part of the Court’s motivation in creating and applying canons 
may be a desire to counteract the effects of the plenary power doctrine.  I do contest, however, the idea that 
these canons are dependent on a lack of constitutional rights for aliens.  
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generosity.”37 The other distortion is the theory advanced by Professor Motomura that if 
the Court were to end the plenary power doctrine, there would no longer be the same 
need to apply canons such as the avoidance canon and the immigration rule of lenity.38 
This Part argues that canons have a permanent role in immigration law that is not 
dependent on, or in many cases even related to, the existence of the plenary power 
doctrine.  Section A illustrates how courts frequently apply canons in immigration cases 
even when no constitutional issues are raised.  It also refutes Professor Motomura’s 
argument that the immigration rule of lenity is a canon that is designed to vindicate 
constitutional rights.  Section B describes briefly how the avoidance canon has a 
permanent role in the interpretation of immigration statutes that would likely increase, 
rather than decrease, if the plenary power doctrine were ended.  
A. Canons That Promote Non-Constitutional Interests 
1. The Immigration Rule of Lenity 
One of the most significant of the immigration canons that is applied regardless of 
whether constitutional issues are raised is the immigration rule of lenity, described by the 
Court as "the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in 
deportation statutes in favor of the alien."39 Professor Motomura is correct in his 
observation that the immigration rule of lenity is an “awkward way to express a phantom 
 
37 See Motomura, supra note 4, at 600, 601 .  See also id. at 573 (stating that in Fong Haw Tan [the case in 
which the Court created the immigration rule of lenity], “the Court allowed phantom constitutional norms 
to guide statutory interpretation by reading statutes in favor of aliens”). 
38 See id. at 602 (stating that courts will “not need to grope for awkward and unpredictable 
subconstitutional solutions”); id. at 603 (“With such changes in constitutional immigration law giving 
judges new freedom to address constitutional claims directly, it seems less objectionable when a court 
breaks the [immigration rule of lenity], which is the least precise subconstitutional solution, by refusing to 
read deportation statutes in favor of aliens”). 
39 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).  The canon has not been completely ignored by 
immigration scholars.  See, e.g., LEGOMSKY, supra note 7, at 156 (calling the immigration rule of lenity 
“[t]he most important rule of statutory interpretation peculiar to immigration”).    
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constitutional norm” and that it represents “overbroad generosity,” in the sense that it 
applies even when the government’s interpretation of a statute does not raise any 
constitutional concerns.40 The problem with this observation is that the immigration rule 
of lenity should not be viewed in such a narrow fashion.   
 The immigration rule of lenity directs courts to interpret ambiguous statutes in 
favor of aliens, regardless of whether constitutional rights are at stake.41 Designed by the 
Court to protect a vulnerable minority, the canon is thus more similar to a canon such as 
the one directing courts to interpret statutes in favor of Native Americans than to the 
avoidance canon.42 The Supreme Court explicitly created the immigration rule of lenity 
in 1948 in a case that did not raise constitutional concerns, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,43 on 
the theory that “because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of 
banishment or exile,” deportation provisions should be strictly construed in favor of the 
alien.44 Courts have continued to apply the canon without regard to the presence of 
constitutional issues.45 For example, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,46 the Court cited the 
 
40 See Motomura, supra note 4, at 601. 
41 The canon has typically been described as being applicable to “deportation” provisions, but it has been 
applied in a broader manner, including in cases involving the interpretation of provisions applicable only to 
excludable aliens.  See Slocum, supra note 30, at 523.  See also Mamouzian v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1129, 
1136 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the “briefs of aliens seeking refugee status must be reviewed with lenity 
and any ambiguities must be resolved in their favor” in the same way that statutes are to be construed in 
favor of aliens).    
42 See Slocum, supra note 30, at 557-58; see also Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in 
Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 439-40, 445-46 (2005) (describing how Chief Justice 
Marshall created “powerful” canons in order to protect tribes even though Congress had plenary power 
over Indian affairs as a constitutional matter). 
43 333 U.S. 6 (1948). 
44 Id. at 10.  In construing an ambiguous statute which provided for the deportation of aliens convicted of 
certain crimes in favor of the alien, the Court stated that “since the stakes are considerable for the 
individual, we will not assume that Congress means to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required 
by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”  Id. 
45 See Slocum, supra note 30, at 521 n.23 (listing cases).  The Court does not always remember the canon, 
however.  See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (explaining that if a statute has criminal 
applications, “the rule of lenity applies” to the Court's interpretation of the statute even in immigration 
cases “[b]ecause we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a 
criminal or noncriminal context”).   
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canon when interpreting the “well-founded fear” standard for asylum, and in INS v. 
Errico,47 the Court cited the canon when interpreting a statute that provided relief from 
deportation.      
 2. Other Canons 
Other canons in addition to the immigration rule of lenity are frequently applied 
by courts to interpret statutes in favor of aliens in cases that do not involve any 
constitutional issues.  Due to the frequency with which Congress enacts immigration 
legislation with possible retroactive effects, the presumption against retroactivity has 
often been considered by courts in immigration cases.  Congressional enactments that 
operate retroactively do not violate the Constitution.48 The presumption against 
retroactivity is a demanding canon to overcome, however, and requires statutory 
language that is “so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation” before statutes will 
be given retroactive effect.49 In INS v. St. Cyr,50 for example, the Court held that 
provisions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 199651 (“AEDPA”) 
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 199652 
(“IIRIRA”) that repealed discretionary relief from deportation did not apply retroactively 
 
46 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987). 
47 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966).  See also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (citing “the longstanding 
principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien . . . .” when 
interpreting a provision that repealed discretionary relief from deportation); Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 
126 S.Ct. 2422, 2429-30 (2006) (quoting the language in St. Cyr that refers to the immigration rule of lenity 
in describing the alien’s argument that the canon should be applied). 
48 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325 n.55 (“[O]ur decision today is fully consistent with a recognition of 
Congress’ power to act retrospectively.  We simply assert, as we have consistently done in the past, that in 
legislating retroactively, Congress must make its intention plain.”).  But see Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking 
Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1998) (arguing that 
courts could strike down retroactive immigration provisions as a violation of due process). 
49 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316-17.  Although the statute must be “clear,” the Court in a recent immigration case 
stated that the canon does not require that the statute contain an “express provision about temporal reach.”  
Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S.Ct. at 2430. 
50 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
51 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1276. 
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because the provisions lacked a “clearly expressed statement of congressional intent” that 
they be applied retroactively.53 
Another canon particularly relevant to immigration law is the long-standing 
Charming Betsy canon, derived from the Court’s decision in Murray v. The Schooner 
Charming Betsy,54 requiring that federal statutes be construed, where reasonably possible, 
not to conflict with international law.55 In addition, canons such as the presumption that 
Congress intends judicial review of administrative action and the canon requiring a clear 
congressional statement before habeas corpus jurisdiction will be barred are often applied 
in cases that raise constitutional issues.56 Theses canons are not limited to situations 
where constitutional issues are raised, however, and have also been applied in cases with 
no constitutional issues.57 
B. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and the End of the  
 Plenary Power Doctrine 
 
The canons described above are part of the Court’s longstanding practice of 
applying canons without regard to whether any constitutional issues are raised.  The 
 
52 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 3009-546.   
53 533 U.S. at 320 & n.45.  See also Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S.Ct. 2422 (considering the presumption 
against retroactivity to be part of its analysis of the temporal scope of an IIRIRA amendment to the INA 
enlarging the provision allowing for reinstatement of prior removal orders but ultimately holding that 
Congress was sufficiently clear in expressing its intent that the statute be applied to a reentry into the 
United States that occurred before the effective date of IIRIRA).   
54 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
55 See, e.g., Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 830 & n.28 (9th Cir. 2000) (construing statute in accordance with 
international law and stating that the court would not presume that Congress intended to override 
international law “when the statute can reasonably be reconciled with the law of nations”).  See also Natsu 
Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the “Other”: Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and why 
U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 429 (2002) 
(arguing that immigration law should incorporate international law).  But see Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 
423 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2005) (questioning whether the canon “can influence the construction and 
application of even ambiguous statutes . . . .”). 
56 See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298-300 (citing both canons in a case that raised a constitutional issue). 
57 See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (describing a situation where the canon requiring a clear 
congressional statement before habeas jurisdiction will be barred was applied where no constitutional 
issues were raised); Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63-64 (1993) (citing the 
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avoidance canon is different in the sense that its (proper) application is tied to the extent 
to which the plenary power doctrine allows constitutional challenges to be considered in 
immigration cases.  The canon is implicated if the government’s interpretation of a statute 
“would raise serious constitutional problems” and “an alternative interpretation of a 
statute is ‘fairly possible.’”58 Currently, in several areas of immigration law, the plenary 
power doctrine does not prevent courts from considering constitutional challenges to 
immigration provisions.59 If the plenary power doctrine foreclosed constitutional 
challenges, however, there would be little legitimate role for the avoidance canon.  
 Although the legitimate use of the avoidance canon depends on the scope of the 
plenary power doctrine, the avoidance canon is a not a product of the plenary power 
doctrine.  It is a canon of general application that is not specific to immigration law.  The 
Court considers the validity of the canon to be “beyond debate” and believes that 
applying the canon helps enact congressional intent because Congress would prefer the 
statutory interpretation that does not raise constitutional doubts.60 Ending the plenary 
power doctrine would thus not render the avoidance canon unnecessary.  Rather, it would 
expand, perhaps greatly, the potential for legitimate application of the avoidance canon 
because there would be more constitutional issues to avoid.61 Thus, as long as courts are 
willing to recognize at least some constitutional constraints on Congress, the avoidance 
 
presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action in preserving judicial review of 
a challenge to a legalization program).     
58 St. Cyr., 533 U.S. at 299-300.  
59 See infra Part III (describing the current scope of the plenary power doctrine and outlining areas where 
successful constitutional challenges can be made). 
60 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005).  See also infra notes 242-50 and accompanying text 
(discussing whether the canon is consistent with congressional intent)..    
61 The avoidance canon is only applicable if a statue lacks clarity.  If the constitutional rules are clear, 
however unlikely this may be, and Congress drafts legislation with the rules in mind, such a potential 
increase in the use of the avoidance canon could be diminished.  See infra Part V.B. (describing the theory 
that Congress legislates in light of legal constraints).   
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canon should be viewed as a permanent member of the substantive canons that courts use 
to interpret immigration statutes. 
Furthermore, instead of viewing the usefulness of the avoidance canon as being 
tied to the existence of the plenary power doctrine, those supporting greater constitutional 
rights for aliens should support the permanent role of the avoidance canon.62 Even if new 
constitutional rights were created in theory, constitutional rights are systematically 
"underenforced" by the judiciary.63 This is especially true in immigration law.64 The 
avoidance canon allows courts to vindicate constitutional principles by narrowing 
questionable but not necessarily invalid statutes.65 Supporters of judicial enforcement of 
constitutional rights for aliens should therefore support the avoidance canon.  In any case, 
the application of the avoidance canon would not be diminished by granting greater 
constitutional rights to aliens.  Instead, use of the canon would likely be increased, 
possibly significantly.       
II. Canons Produce Both Second-Best Interpretations and 
 Predictability in Immigration Law  
 
Canons have a permanent place in immigration law, but any defense of canons 
must concede that they have not always been applied in a proper manner.  Often the 
criticism is that certain canons have been underutilized by courts in immigration cases.  
 
62 See infra notes 219-29 and accompanying text for further discussion of the desirability gains for aliens 
coming through statutory rather than constitutional decisions. 
63 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2113 (2005) (noting that courts 
underenforce constitutional rights for good reasons, including “courts' limited factfinding capacities, their 
weak democratic pedigree, their limited legitimacy, and their likely ineffectiveness as frequent instigators 
of social reform”). 
64 One theory of the plenary power doctrine is that aliens have constitutional rights but courts do not 
enforce them.  See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 377 
(2004).  Even if the plenary power doctrine were ended, it is uncertain that courts would vigorously 
recognize and enforce constitutional rights in immigration cases.  See infra note 222. 
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Both the presumption against retroactivity and the Charming Betsy canon have arguably 
not been applied in cases where application was warranted.66 Other immigration canons 
are likely similarly underutilized.  As compared to clear statement rules like the canon 
requiring a clear congressional statement before habeas corpus jurisdiction will be barred, 
underutilization is probably particularly true with regard to weaker, tie-breaker canons, 
such as the immigration rule of lenity, that are only considered when a court finds a 
statute to be ambiguous at the end of its search for statutory meaning.67 In cases of 
underutilization, the solution is simple: courts should apply the canons more often.  In 
fact, courts should apply canons in every case where application is warranted.68 
In contrast to the canons that are underutilized, the avoidance canon has been 
accused, most prominently by Professor Motomura, of being overutilized by courts.  
Professor Motomura is correct that the avoidance canon is overutilized in immigration 
cases when courts apply it in order to avoid constitutional issues that are really based on 
phantom constitutional norms and are thus not “serious.”69 As part of his analysis, 
however, Professor Motomura states that sometimes a statutory decision “can incorporate 
a phantom constitutional norm only by going beyond reasonable readings of a [statutory] 
text.  Phantom norm decisionmaking may help some aliens when a case evokes 
 
65 See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 468-69 (1987).  
This function of the avoidance canon is especially powerful considering that the canon often requires courts 
to adopt second-best interpretations.  See infra Part II.A. 
66 See, e.g., Michael G. Heyman, Immigration Law in the Supreme Court: The Flagging Spirit of the Law, 
28 J. LEGIS. 113, 134-37 (2002) (arguing that the Court has ignored the Charming Betsy canon in 
immigration cases); Comment, Vashti D. Van Wyke, Retroactivity and Immigrant Crimes Since St. Cyr: 
Emerging Signs of Judicial Restraint, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (2006) (arguing that courts have neglected to 
apply the presumption against retroactivity in cases where it has been applicable). 
67 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 341 (2000).  Cf. John Calvin Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the 
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198-99 (1985) (stating that the criminal rule of lenity 
“survives more as a makeweight for results that seem right on other grounds than as a consistent policy of 
statutory interpretation”). 
68 See infra note 108 (explaining that whether a canon is applicable requires a judgment call by the court).   
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sympathy, but we cannot predict those situations.”70 Professor Motomura’s analysis 
conflates two separate aspects of the avoidance canon and fails to appreciate that the 
application of the canon in any given case raises two distinct issues that should not be 
confused.  The issue of whether courts use the avoidance canon to avoid serious 
constitutional issues must be analyzed separately from a second issue of whether courts 
use the avoidance canon as a tool for producing legitimate statutory interpretations.  The 
conflation of these two issues exaggerates the overutilization of the avoidance canon and 
creates a false impression that the canon (and likely canons in general) inherently creates 
unpredictability in immigration law.71 
This Part explains how the application of the avoidance canon often produces 
second-best interpretations.  These second-best interpretations are part of the legitimate 
functioning of the avoidance canon and, while aggressive, cannot be viewed as examples 
of overutilization.  This Part then argues that these interpretations, and those produced by 
canons generally, do not add unpredictability to immigration law. 
 A. Jean v. Nelson and the Inherent Nature of Second-Best  
 Interpretations 
 
Professor Motomura points to the Court’s decision in Jean v. Nelson72 as an 
example of a case where the Court went beyond a reasonable reading of the statute in 
order to avoid a serious constitutional issue that was in reality based on a phantom 
constitutional norm.73 In Jean, the Court avoided the issue of whether INS parole 
 
69 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (explaining the phantom norms theory).  
70 See Motomura, supra note 4, at 587, 601.   
71 Undoubtedly, there are other examples where canons are overutilized.  See infra note 281 (describing one 
such example).  This Article only focuses on the one most relevant to immigration law and that is the 
subject of the most confusion. 
72 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
73 See Motomura, supra note 4, at 604. 
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decisions based on race and national origin violated the Constitution by holding that the 
relevant statutes and regulations provided for nondiscriminatory parole consideration.74 
Professor Motomura believes that the Jean decision was based on a phantom 
constitutional norm because “the Court has never held an immigration classification 
unconstitutional on the ground that it discriminates on the basis of race or national 
origin.”75 
While Professor Motomura’s criticism of Jean as a decision relying on a phantom 
constitutional norm may be well-deserved, his criticism of Jean as a statutory 
interpretation decision that incorrectly went beyond any reasonable reading of the statute 
is less so.76 The Court has recently stated that the avoidance canon’s function is to 
“choos[e] among plausible meanings of an ambiguous statute,” as opposed to a clear 
statement rule that “implies a special substantive limit on the application of an otherwise 
unambiguous mandate.”77 Nevertheless, applying the avoidance canon requires a court to 
sometimes adopt the second-best interpretation; one that is, in the Court’s words, “fairly 
 
74 472 U.S. at 848. 
75 Motomura, supra note 4, at 593.        
76 Part III.B. questions whether Jean would still be a phantom norms decision if were decided under the 
current version of the plenary power doctrine.  It is not clear, however, that the decision in Jean was driven 
by constitutional concerns.  The Court did not state that its interpretations were made in order to avoid 
constitutional issues raised by an interpretation of the statutes and regulations that would allow for 
discriminatory parole decisions.  Rather, the Court held that it would not consider any constitutional issues 
because it was obliged to resolve the case on non-constitutional grounds if possible.  Courts decide cases on 
constitutional grounds only as a “last resort” when there are no other grounds to decide the case.  See 
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1574 (2000).  Thus, a court that decides a case on statutory grounds instead of 
constitutional grounds is not necessarily implying that a broad interpretation of the statute in question 
would raise serious constitutional concerns.  In contrast, a court applying the avoidance canon is 
necessarily holding that a broad interpretation of the statute would raise serious constitutional issues.  See 
id. at 1575.  
77 Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 125 S.Ct. 2169, 2183 (2005).  See also Clark v. 
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (“The canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play only when, 
after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one 
construction.”).  It has been described as a clear statement canon by some, however.  See ESKRIDGE & 
FRICKEY, supra note 8, at 599.   
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possible” but not the best interpretation.78 The canon would not be particularly useful if 
it compelled a court to adopt a statutory interpretation that would avoid a serious 
constitutional issue only if that interpretation was the most persuasive one.79 Likewise, 
the canon would not be particularly useful if a court required that the two competing 
interpretations be equally plausible—a 50-50 toss up—before it would apply the canon.80 
In such a (relatively rare) case, the court could just apply a tie-breaker canon like the  
immigration rule of lenity.81 
With the understanding that the avoidance canon sometimes requires a court to 
accept a second-best interpretation, the Jean decision can be seen as an exercise in 
legitimate, albeit aggressive, interpretation that is not dissimilar to other decisions by the 
Court involving the avoidance canon.82 The parole statute at issue in Jean gave the 
Attorney General discretionary authority to parole aliens into the country for “urgent 
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit reasons,” with no other explicit 
 
78 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001).  See also William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional 
Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 840 (2001) (describing the Court’s long 
held view that when applying the avoidance canon “a court should prefer a permissible, even if not an 
optimal, reading of the statute to which it can give effect to a pure statutory reading that it must strike 
down”).  
79 Such an application would render the canon superfluous because the Court has a separate doctrine that 
requires courts to avoid deciding constitutional issues if a case can be decided on non-constitutional 
grounds.  See supra note 76.  See also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 270 (1998) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).   
80 It is the rare case where the two competing interpretations are equally plausible.  Far more often, even in 
cases where courts state that a statutory provision is ambiguous, one interpretation is at least slightly more 
persuasive than the next most persuasive interpretation (51-49, for example).  Courts have not resolved the 
issue of how persuasive the second most persuasive interpretation must be in order to label a statutory 
provision “ambiguous,” see supra note 31, but surely a statute can be considered ambiguous without the 
competing interpretations being equally plausible. 
81 See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (discussing the immigration rule of lenity). 
82 Apart from the issue of whether the court believed that it was avoiding a serious constitutional issue, see 
supra note 76, the Jean decision was not strictly an exercise in statutory interpretation.  INS regulations 
provided a list of neutral criteria for the granting of parole, which the Court and the INS interpreted as 
prohibiting the consideration of race and national origin in the parole decisions.  472 U.S. at 850-51.  The 
Court relied, at least in part, on the INS regulations in holding that racial discrimination was prohibited.  
See id. at 855.  The government also argued that it did not have statutory or regulatory authority to consider 
race or national origin, which undoubtedly made the interpretations much easier for the Court. 
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limitations.83 As stated above, the Court believes that the avoidance canon resolves 
statutory ambiguity but does not “impl[y] limitations on otherwise unambiguous text.”84 
Applications of the avoidance canon, and the consequent adoption of second-best 
interpretations, sometimes involves the Court creating exceptions to broad statutes or 
drafting language to insert into the statute at issue, however.    
One recent example of this came in Zadvydas v. Davis,85 where the Court utilized 
the avoidance canon in interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which states only that certain 
aliens “may be detained beyond the [90 day] removal period . . . .”86 Because the 
government’s interpretation of the statute raised a serious constitutional issue by allowing 
the government to definitely detain aliens who legally are considered to have entered the 
country,87 the Court invoked the avoidance canon.88 There was no explicit limitation in 
the statute regarding the length of permitted detention.  Nevertheless, the Court, required 
by the avoidance canon to adopt a "fairly possible" interpretation of the statue which 
would avoid the constitutional questions, “read an implicit limitation into the statute.”89 
The Court, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” decided that 
 
83 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 
84 Spector, 125 S.Ct. at 2183. 
85 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
86 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
87 This is in contrast to aliens who are physically within the United States but are considered under the 
“entry fiction” to have been stopped at the border.  See infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text 
(describing the difference between the two classes). 
88 533 U.S. at 689.   
89 Id. at 689, 701.  The Court did make a perfunctory pass at claiming that the statute was ambiguous.  See 
id. at 697 (“But while ‘may’ suggests discretion, it does not necessarily suggest unlimited discretion.  In 
that respect the word ‘may’ is ambiguous.”).  Under such a mode of interpretation, the parole statute at 
issue in Jean, which stated that the Attorney General “may [] in his discretion parole” “only on a case-by-
case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” is at least as ambiguous as the 
statute in Zadvydas. By stating the criteria that the Attorney General should consider in determining 
whether to grant parole, humanitarian or public benefit reasons, the statute could reasonably be interpreted 
as precluding the Attorney General from denying parole in cases where humanitarian or public benefit 
reasons were present but the Attorney General denied parole solely for reasons that are clearly contrary to 
the public benefit, such as racial discrimination.  Such an interpretation is at least as plausible as the 
implied six-month limitation on the length of detention that the Court imposed in Zadvydas.
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these aliens can only be detained for a six month period unless there is a “significant 
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”90 
As the Jean and Zadvydas decisions illustrate, the Court will create exceptions to 
broad statutory language in order to avoid serious constitutional questions.91 These 
exceptions are often second-best interpretations of the statutes.  Indeed, the Court in 
Zadvydas recognized that its interpretation was not necessarily the most persuasive 
interpretation available.92 The Court placed its second-best interpretation in the context 
of other avoidance cases, however, asserting that it has in the past “read significant 
limitations into other immigration statutes in order to avoid their constitutional 
invalidation.”93 The Court thus made clear that second-best statutory interpretations, 
even aggressive ones, are part of the legitimate application of the avoidance canon and 
thus should not be seen as overutilization of the canon.94 
90 Id. at 701. 
91 Cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 400 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“A disturbing number of this 
Court’s cases have applied the canon of constitutional doubt to statutes that were on their face clear.”). 
92 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (stating that “[t]he Government argues that the statute means what it 
literally says”); Martinez, 543 U.S. at 378 (“As the Court in Zadvydas recognized, the statute can be 
construed ‘literally’ to authorize indefinite detention . . . .”). 
93 533 U.S. at 689.  The Court cited to its decision in United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957), 
where the Court interpreted a provision of the INA allowing the Attorney General to require aliens under 
supervision with a final order of deportation to give the Attorney General any information “as the Attorney 
General may deem fit and proper,” “whether or not” the information was related to the supervision.  Id. at 
195.  In order to avoid a serious constitutional issue, the Court limited the broad statutory language to only 
allow the Attorney General authority to require information “reasonably calculated to keep the Attorney 
General advised regarding the continued availability for departure of aliens whose deportation is overdue.”  
Id. at 202.  The Court reasoned that “[a] restrictive meaning, for what appear to be plain [statutory] words 
may be indicated by . . . the rule of constitutional adjudication . . . that such a restrictive meaning must be 
given if broader meaning would generate constitutional doubts.”  Id. at 199.  Lower courts have made 
similar interpretations.  See, e.g., Shokeh v. Thompson, 369 F.3d 865, 871-72 (5th Cir. 2004) (interpreting 
a statute to include a reasonableness component for the amount of bond to release an alien from detention); 
Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 270 (6th Cir. 2004) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to “include an implicit 
requirement that removal proceedings be concluded within a reasonable time . . . .”). 
94 As stated above, these aggressive interpretations are independent of whether the constitutional issue 
being avoided is a “phantom” one.  For example, the Zadvydas decision, which adopted a second-best 
statutory interpretation, was not based on a “phantom” norm.  See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying 
text. 
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B. The Predictability of Canons 
 
The discussion above focused on the inherent nature of the avoidance canon as 
requiring courts to sometimes adopt second-best interpretations, but second-best 
interpretations are not particular to the avoidance canon.  Indeed, they should be viewed 
as being a part of any canon stronger than a tie-breaker canon, including clear statement 
canons such as the canon requiring a clear congressional statement before habeas corpus 
jurisdiction will be barred.95 For example, in a recent immigration case, Demore v. 
Kim,96 the Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider Kim’s habeas corpus challenge 
to his detention pending his removal hearing.  In the Court’s view, the relevant provision, 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), did not contain “a superclear statement, ‘magic words’ requirement 
for the congressional expression of” an intent to preclude habeas review.97 Obviously, by 
requiring the government to meet such a difficult burden of proof, the Court was willing 
to accept a second-best interpretation of the statute.  
 These second-best interpretations do not necessarily make statutory decisions that 
apply canons unpredictable.  If applied correctly and consistently, well-established 
canons can act as background rules that guide Congress by sending signals about how 
statutes will be interpreted.98 The Court has endorsed this theory, stating in an 
immigration case, McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.,99 that “[i]t is presumable that 
Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory construction.”100 
95 See supra note 31 (describing how canons are not all triggered by the same level of uncertainty).   
96 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
97 Id. (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 327 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
98 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 125, (2001); 
Schacter, supra note 33, at 600 (arguing that this is the best theory of the compatability of canons with 
legislative supremacy). 
99 498 U.S. 479 (1991). 
100 Id. at 496.  It therefore followed that “given [the Court’s] well-settled presumption favoring 
interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action,” a statute precluding direct 
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The recent history of habeas corpus jurisdiction in immigration cases is a good 
example of the background rules theory at work.  In 1996, Congress passed AEDPA and 
IIRIRA which made significant changes to the judicial review provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).101 In INS v. St. Cyr, the Court, after applying 
the avoidance canon, the presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action 
and the “the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to 
repeal habeas jurisdiction,” rejected the government’s argument that Congress had clearly 
divested courts of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 over habeas corpus actions filed by 
criminal aliens to challenge removal orders.102 
In response to the Court’s decision in St. Cyr, Congress passed the REAL ID Act 
of 2005.103 Lower courts have found that the new law eliminates habeas corpus review of 
final removal orders by providing that petitions for review in the federal courts of appeals 
are the exclusive path into court.104 Unlike the provisions enacted in IIRIRA, the 
amendments made by the REAL ID Act bear the influence of the Court’s command in St. 
Cyr that congressional repeals of habeas must be worded clearly, explicitly referencing 
28 U.S.C. § 2241 “or any other habeas corpus provision.”105 Presumably, Congress will 
 
review of the decisions of the INS denying applications for Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) status 
would not deprive courts of considering due process challenges to the manner in which SAW provisions 
were administered by the INS.  Id. 
101 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1963 (2000). 
102 533 U.S. at 299.     
103 Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252).  See also infra notes 223-29 and 
accompanying text (discussing the REAL ID Act and judicial review). 
104 See, e.g., Haider v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 902, 910 (8th Cir. 2006). 
105 § 106(a)(3), 119 Stat. at 311.  See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 465 (2006) (discussing the lack of similarly 
clear language in AEDPA and IIRIRA).  Like other provisions purporting to strip courts of habeas corpus 
jurisdiction, the REAL ID Act is likely to be narrowly interpreted, however.  See, e.g., Nadarajah v. 
Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006) (interpreting the Act as not precluding habeas corpus 
review in cases that do not involve a final order of removal). 
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be similarly explicit hereafter when it intends to preclude courts from exercising 
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions.106 
While canons can add predictability to the law when used correctly, they are only 
as legitimate as the courts applying them.  It is true that courts have used canons in an 
inconsistent, and thus unpredictable, manner.  Courts underutilize some canons and have 
overutilized others, such as the avoidance canon.107 Even when canons are applied in 
good faith by courts, statutory interpretation decisions are based on the context of the 
case and therefore can be seen as unpredictable in the sense that the outcome of the case, 
at least in close cases, cannot be known for certain before the case is decided.108 
Professor Motomura argues that application of canons in immigration law has 
been unpredictable and that courts should instead decide cases on constitutional grounds, 
but any inherent unpredictability in canons should not devalue them, at least as compared 
to constitutional decisions.  Constitutional decisions, even when the rules to be applied 
are clear, can be just as unpredictable as statutory decisions.109 The Nguyen v. INS110 
case is a good example of how abandoning the plenary power doctrine would not 
necessarily add predictability to immigration law.  In Nguyen, the Court purported to 
 
106 Cf. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2210 (2002) 
(stating that using the avoidance canon to interpret ambiguous statutes “usefully results in more precise 
legislation”).  Thus, while St. Cyr may have involved a second-best interpretation, Congress learned from 
the decision just how explicitly the Court requires that a statute revoking habeas corpus jurisdiction be 
worded.  If the Court continues to apply canons consistently, and Congress continues to follow the 
guidance of the Court, the need for second-best interpretations would diminish. 
107 See infra Part III (discussing the overutilization of the avoidance canon). 
108 The determination of when the application of a canon is warranted is a judgment call requiring a finding 
that there is statutory uncertainty.  See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.  Even if a court finds a 
statutory provision to be clear and declines to apply a canon, some may disagree and accuse the court of 
underutilizing the canon.  The proper application of canons thus relies on the good faith interpretations of 
judges, which are not easily categorized as involving over- or underutilization of canons.   
109 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William 
Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1381-82 (2006) (asserting that the Rehnquist Court’s “head-
scratching unpredictability in many important areas of constitutional law had less to do with shifting (or 
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apply mainstream, heightened scrutiny review to an immigration provision that explicitly 
discriminated on the basis of gender.111 Despite the weakness of the justifications for the 
discrimination, the Court upheld the provision.112 The decision is perhaps not as 
surprising as it would seem.  In a recent article, Professor Winkler shows that even the 
Court’s application of the strict scrutiny standard depends heavily on context and in some 
areas of law does not result in invalidation in a significant percentage of cases.113 
I am not attempting to prove that statutory decisions are more predictable than 
constitutional ones.  It does seem clear, however, that canons do not add unpredictability 
to statutory interpretation and the law in a way that is somehow novel.  Rather, 
unpredictability should be seen as more of a perennial concern, to the extent it is a 
concern, about law in general than one that is specific to canons.   
III. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and the Plenary   
 Power Doctrine 
 
While overutilization of the avoidance canon cannot be blamed second-best 
statutory interpretations, the Court has overused the canon, through phantom 
constitutional norms reasoning, to avoid constitutional issues that were not serious.114 
The potential for courts to overutilize the avoidance canon in immigration cases through 
phantom norms reasoning will always exist, of course.  Unlike second-best 
interpretations, though, phantom norms decisions are not a necessary part of the 
 
moderating) philosophies on the part of the Justices and more to do with its flexible, case-by-case approach 
to constitutional interpretation”).  
110 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
111 But see Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response to Professor Spiro, 16 
GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 835, 836 (2002) (arguing that the Nguyen Court was implicitly taking the immigration 
context into account even while it expressly denied doing so). 
112 See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing the decision). 
113 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, VAND. L. REV. (2006) (will add citations when article appears on Westlaw). 
114 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
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application of the avoidance canon in immigration cases.  Recent decisions by the Court 
reveal that the plenary power doctrine, while still viable, is sufficiently weak now that the 
application of the avoidance canon in several areas of immigration law does not have to 
involve a phantom constitutional norm.  This Part first describes the current status of the 
plenary power doctrine and then outlines a number of important areas in immigration law 
where the avoidance canon can be, and has been, legitimately applied by courts.    
 A. The Status of the Plenary Power Doctrine  
 In the first immigration cases, the Court seemed to assert that immigration 
legislation would not be subjected by courts to constitutional constraints.115 Eventually, a 
significant exception to the plenary power doctrine emerged.  This exception was 
applicable only to deportable aliens, those aliens who had been deemed under 
immigration law to have entered the United States.116 For these aliens, courts limited the 
plenary power doctrine to "substantive" criteria for admission and expulsion, while 
applying mainstream constitutional principles to "procedural" matters such as deportation 
hearings.117 
Notwithstanding the procedural due process exception for deportable aliens, and 
despite constant criticism from commentators, the plenary power doctrine remained 
 
115 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts,
22 CONST. L. Q. 925, 926 (1995); Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 862 (stating that early cases “denied virtually 
any authority for the judiciary to review substantive decisions as to which classes of aliens should be 
entitled to enter or remain in the country”).   
116 See infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (describing the entry doctrine). 
117 The Court in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982), described the distinction between aliens who 
had entered the country (and thus were entitled to a hearing that comported with procedural due process) 
and those who had not as follows: “[A]n alien seeking admission to the United States requests a privilege 
and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a 
sovereign prerogative . . . However, once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the 
ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”  Id. at 32.  Some 
courts have narrowed the scope of the plenary power doctrine by casting constitutional challenges as 
procedural rather than substantive.  See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of 
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largely untouched by the Supreme Court for most of the twentieth century.118 By the end 
of the twentieth century, however, some scholars, including Professor Motomura, 
described what they viewed as a weakening of the plenary power doctrine.  The 
diminishment of the doctrine came through exceptions to it, such as a broadening of the 
due process exception, and a willingness of courts to subject statutes to a rational basis 
test instead of a complete bar to judicial review.119 Some scholars even predicted the 
eventual demise of the plenary power doctrine.120 
Those predicting the end of the plenary power doctrine are certainly correct to the 
extent that the plenary power doctrine no longer forecloses, if it ever did, judicial review 
of immigration statutes.121 The Court now reviews the constitutionality of governmental 
actions, although it has mostly done so under a lenient rational basis standard.122 
Similarly, lower courts consistently apply the rational basis standard to both equal 
protection and substantive due process challenges.123 Courts have invalidated 
immigration provisions under the rational basis standard of review, but generally the 
classification invalidated has been viewed by the court as an interpretation of a statute 
 
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 
(1992).    
118 See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 865; Schuck, supra note 22, at 1 (stating that “[i]n a legal firmament 
transformed by revolutions in due process and equal protection doctrine and by a new conception of 
judicial role, immigration law remains the realm in which government authority is at the zenith, and 
individual entitlement is at the nadir”).   
119 See Motomura, supra note 4, at 608 (describing how lower courts created a rational basis test); 
Legomsky, supra note 115, at 931-37 (describing the “mild rational basis test” that had been developed by 
courts). 
120 See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 257 (2000) 
(arguing that shifts in the international context augur the end of the plenary power doctrine); Legomsky, 
supra note 115, at 934-37 (predicting that the plenary power doctrine will “wear away by attrition”). 
121 This is true at least to the extent that the statutes regulate deportable aliens.  Inadmissible aliens have 
traditionally been without constitutional protection, although some lower courts have questioned this 
doctrine.  See infra note 138.  
122 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).   
123 See, e.g., Cordes v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the “disparate treatment of 
similarly situated aliens under the immigration laws implicates the guarantee of equal protection”); Rojas-
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made by the Board of Immigration Appeals or the INS rather than a classification made 
explicit by Congress.124 
While it is well-established, at least in the lower courts, that rational basis scrutiny 
can be applied to immigration statutes, it is no longer clear that the plenary power 
doctrine always precludes the application of a more stringent standard of review when a 
statute infringes fundamental rights or raises equal protection concerns.125 In 2001, in 
Nguyen v. INS,126 the Court upheld a provision in the INA that more generously conferred 
birth citizenship on the out-of-wedlock children of American citizen mothers than those 
of American citizen fathers.127 In contrast to its earlier decision in a similar case, Fiallo 
v. Bell,128 in Nguyen the Court purported to apply the standard equal protection analysis 
for gender-based classifications.  The Court explicitly refused to rely on the plenary 
power precedents in upholding the provision, disclaiming any need to “assess the 
implications of statements in our earlier cases regarding the wide deference afforded to 
Congress in the exercise of it s immigration and naturalization power.”129 In another 
 
Reyes v. INS, 235 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying the rational basis standard to a substantive due 
process challenge). 
124 See, e.g., Cordes, 421 F.3d at 896 (striking down the “INS’ decision” to “afford section 212(c) relief” to 
some permanent resident residents but not others); Servine-Espinoza v. Ashcroft, 309 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 
2002) (striking down an INS policy of allowing inadmissible aliens but not deportable aliens to apply for 
discretionary relief from deportation); Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001) (striking down a 
BIA decision not to recognize foreign expungements for simple drug possession offenses); Garberding v. 
INS, 30 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1994) (striking down a BIA decision not to recognize an expungement of a 
state conviction).    
125 Cf. Flores-Ledezma v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying the rational basis test 
because the classification did not “involve fundamental rights and did not proceed along suspect lines”). 
126 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
127 The same constitutional challenge had been before the Court in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), 
but the case was decided on the basis of standing.  In dicta, however, five members of the Court indicated 
that the provision was unconstitutional.  See Pillard, supra note 111, at 836. 
128 430 U.S. 787 (1977).   
129 533 U.S. at 72-73; see also Pillard, supra note 111, at 845 (“At least superficially, the Nguyen decision 
reads . . . not like a decision about immigration and naturalization, but like a conventional sex 
discrimination case.”).  One theory that would distinguish Nguyen from traditional immigration cases is 
that the plenary power doctrine is inapplicable when the case involves a claim of citizenship at birth and 
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decision from 2001, Zadvydas, the Court stated that the government’s exercise of its 
immigration power was subject to “important constitutional limitations,” and applied the 
same due process analysis to the detention of aliens as it would have to the detention of 
citizens.130 Together, these two cases contributed to the perception, at least temporarily, 
that the plenary power doctrine was substantially weakened, if not ended entirely. 131 
The Zadvydas and Nguyen decisions may be evidence of the further weakening of 
the plenary power doctrine, but the Court’s recent decision in Demore v. Kim132 
establishes that the plenary power doctrine is still viable.  In Kim, the Court held that the 
mandatory detention of criminal resident aliens pending their deportation hearings does 
not violate due process.133 The Court stated that detention is "a constitutionally valid 
aspect of the deportation process" and used the classic plenary power reasoning that "[i]n 
the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly 
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."134 The Court 
distinguished Zadvydas, implying that Zadvydas, unlike Kim, was not really an 
immigration case and therefore not subject to the plenary power doctrine.  The potentially 
 
thus could be said to involve a citizen and not an alien.  See Miller, 523 U.S. at 480-81 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 96-97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
130 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).  See also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 553 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Court in Zadvydas disagreed with the idea that “the constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in avoiding physical confinement, even for aliens already ordered removed, was conceptually 
different from the liberty interest of citizens”); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1017 
(2002) (noting that the Zadvydas Court "applied to immigration detention the due process principles 
generated in civil detention cases outside the immigration context, without any suggestion that a different 
due process analysis should apply").  See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (describing the 
Zadvydas decision). 
131 See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law: D. Due Process, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 287, 297 (2003) (“When the Supreme Court decided Zadvydas two years ago, legal scholars 
celebrated the case as an important step toward the abandonment of the plenary power doctrine.”).  Cf. T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L. J. 365, 366 (2002) (stating that the case “may represent a radical shift” but concluding that it is 
“unlikely to present the death knell for the plenary power doctrine”).   
132 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 521, 531. 
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indefinite detention in Zadvydas “did not serve its purported immigration purpose” 
because it affected aliens for whom removal was "no longer practically attainable" due to 
the aliens’ native countries refusing to accept their return.135 In contrast, the detention in 
Kim "necessarily serve[d] the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from 
fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings."136 
B. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and “Phantom” 
 Constitutional Norms 
 
Because the plenary power doctrine has at least some continuing vitality, in order 
to avoid the problem of “phantom” constitutional norms, use of the avoidance canon in 
immigration law must still account for the deference given the government when 
constitutional challenges are made.  As discussed above, the plenary power doctrine has 
weakened, however.  There is more room for legitimate use of the avoidance canon in 
immigration law than ever before.  
Despite the continued existence of the plenary power doctrine, there are areas of 
constitutional concern where the rules applied to immigration provisions do not differ 
from those applicable to non-immigration provisions.  For example, it is well-established 
that courts will consider procedural due process challenges by deportable aliens.137 Some 
lower courts have held that even inadmissible aliens, those aliens deemed by the law not 
to have entered the country, have due process rights.138 Lower courts have thus properly 
 
135 Id. at 527.  See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (suggesting that the absence of likely removal makes the 
detention less immigration related and thus affects the extent to which the plenary power doctrine applies).        
136 538 U.S. at 528. 
137 See supra note 117. 
138 See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 410 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (“The fact that excludable 
aliens are entitled to less process . . . does not mean that they are not at all protected by the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 941 (2003). 
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applied the avoidance canon in order to avoid serious due process issues, including ones 
involving the availability of judicial review.139 
Similar to procedural due process challenges, the government does not receive the 
benefit of the plenary power doctrine in cases involving a claim that a statute violates a 
structural provision of the Constitution rather than an amendment to the Constitution.  
For example, in INS v. Chadha,140 the Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional 
as a violation of the Constitution's structural requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment.  The Court reasoned that it could review whether "Congress has chosen a 
constitutionally permissible means of implementing [its] power" over immigration.141 
Similarly, in St. Cyr, the Court ignored the plenary power doctrine in holding that 
removal of habeas corpus authority by Congress would raise serious constitutional issues 
involving the Suspension Clause.142 
Courts have also entertained challenges to “non-substantive” immigration laws 
without according any special deference to the government.  For example, in Detroit Free 
Press v. Ashcroft,143 the Sixth Circuit explained that “substantive immigration laws 
answer the questions, ‘who is allowed entry’ or ‘who can be deported’” in finding a First 
Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings.144 The distinction drawn by the 
Sixth Circuit between substantive and non-substantive provisions may not be a valid one, 
 
139 See, e.g., Arreola-Arreola v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 956, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting a statute to 
allow for judicial review because a statute precluding judicial review “would raise serious constitutional 
concerns because it would potentially deprive an alien of the full and fair hearing guaranteed to him by the 
Constitution”); United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We have recently held that an 
erroneous denial of the opportunity to apply for § 212(c) relief may constitute a due process violation.”). 
140 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
141 Id. at 940-41. 
142 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001).  See Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. 
St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 563 (2002) (explaining that the plenary power doctrine played 
no explicit role in St. Cyr).      
143 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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however, after the Court’s decision in Kim, which relied on the plenary power doctrine in 
upholding a non-substantive immigration provision.145 
Even in areas where the government sometimes receives deference under the 
plenary power doctrine, application of the avoidance canon can be legitimate.  
Substantive due process challenges, at least to the extent they are connected to the 
detention of deportable aliens,146 are one such example.  It could be argued that Zadvydas 
and Kim fit Professor Motomura’s phantom constitutional norms pattern.147 First, the 
Court in Zadvydas identified a serious constitutional issue raised by the possibility of 
indefinite detention of aliens when there is no realistic prospect of deportation.  Instead of 
deciding the constitutional issue, the Court avoided it by applying the avoidance canon 
and interpreting the relevant statute narrowly.148 Second, the Court in Kim declined to 
apply the constitutional norm identified in Zadvydas when it was forced to directly 
address the constitutionality of detention.149 
Such an interpretation of Zadvydas and Kim, while possible, is not the best 
interpretation of the cases.  The constitutional norm identified in Zadvydas does not 
appear to be a phantom norm.  Zadvydas was not the first case to assert that aliens have 
substantive due process rights that are implicated by detention.  In Reno v. Flores,150 the 
Court upheld regulations governing the detention of juvenile aliens but indicated that the 
plenary power doctrine would not protect the regulations from substantive due process 
 
144 Id. at 687-88 (claiming that “[t]he Supreme Court has always interpreted the Constitution meaningfully 
to limit non-substantive immigration laws, without granting the Government special deference”). 
145 See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. 
146 See infra notes 172-94 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between inadmissible and 
deportable aliens and why indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens is constitutional). 
147 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (describing the pattern). 
148 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text. 
150 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
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review.151 Moreover, the Court in Kim seemed to accept Zadvydas as constitutional 
precedent and attempted to distinguish rather than ignore the case.152 Lower courts have 
likewise treated Zadvydas as a constitutional holding.153 
Similar to Zadvydas, the Kim decision should not be interpreted as precluding 
substantive due process challenges to detention.  Although the Court in Kim upheld the 
detention at issue in the case, it did not merely dismiss the constitutional challenge on the 
basis of the plenary power doctrine.  Indeed, the Court subjected the statute to 
constitutional scrutiny, although it seemed to do so under a rational basis standard rather 
than a more stringent standard of review.154 Lower courts have treated Kim as a case that 
recognized that aliens have substantive due process rights that are implicated by 
detention.  In Ly v. Hansen,155 for example, the Sixth Circuit held that the detention of an 
alien for one and one-half years pending deportation proceedings was unreasonably long 
and violated the alien’s substantive due process rights.156 
151 Id. at 306 (citing to the plenary power doctrine but stating, "[o]f course, the INS regulation must still 
meet the (unexacting) standard of rationally advancing some legitimate governmental purpose").  The 
Court held that the detention of juvenile aliens pending release to a parent or guardian did not violate 
substantive due process because juveniles "are always in some form of custody" and therefore have a 
diminished interest in absolute liberty.  Absent from the Court's opinion was any notion that the detention 
at issue could not be reviewed. 
152 See Kim, 538 U.S. at 527-39.              
153 See, e.g., Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that detention for 90 
days under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) does not violate due process and that the Supreme Court in Kim “clarified 
that the Zadvydas due process analysis applies only if a danger of indefinite detention exists and there is no 
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future”); Shokeh v. Thompson, 369 F.3d 
865, 871-72 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that a serious constitutional problem would arise if indefinite detention 
were caused by the inability to pay a bond and interpreted the statute to include a reasonableness 
component).     
154 538 U.S. at 528 (“But when the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due Process Clause does 
not require it to employ the least burdensome means to accomplish its goal.  The evidence Congress had 
before it certainly supports the approach it selected even if other, hypothetical studies might have suggested 
different courses of actions.”).  See also Leading Cases, supra note 131, at 292 n.48 (stating that the Kim 
Court's review of the detention provision was somewhat more searching than traditional plenary power 
review).   
155 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2004). 
156 Id. at 271-72 (stating that “Congress’s plenary control must still be exercised within the bounds of the 
Constitution”). 
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Courts can also legitimately apply the avoidance canon in at least some cases 
involving equal protection claims.  It is true that courts have generally not applied a 
heightened standard in cases involving equal protection claims, but it is now well-
established that such claims are subject to rational basis scrutiny.157 Under rational basis 
scrutiny, provisions that discriminate on the basis of gender or race, for example, could 
be seen as irrational and struck down without having to apply a heightened standard.158 
The INS parole decisions at issue in Jean v. Nelson provides one possible 
example where discrimination based on race and national origin could be held to violate 
the Constitution under a rational basis standard.  Recall that the Court avoided the 
constitutional issues in Jean by deciding the case on statutory grounds.159 Professor 
Motomura argues that Jean was based on a phantom constitutional norm because “the 
Court has never held an immigration classification unconstitutional on the ground that it 
discriminates on the basis of race or national origin.”160 It is still true that the Court has 
never invalidated an immigration classification on the basis of race, but Jean would not 
necessarily be a phantom norm decision if it were decided today.  Courts have allowed 
discrimination on the basis of national origin,161 but the Ninth Circuit has indicated that 
racial discrimination in parole decisions violates the Constitution and would not survive 
even a low level of constitutional scrutiny.162 Thus, the Court could avoid the 
constitutional issues that would be raised by parole decisions based on invidious racial 
 
157 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. 
158 See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of 
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 66-68 (1998). 
159 See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text (discussing the decision).    
160 Motomura, supra note 4, at 593.        
161 See, e.g., Rodriguez-Silva v. INS, 242 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that the equal protection 
principles that are implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment do not in any way restrict 
Congress's power to use nationality or place of origin as criteria for the naturalization of aliens or for their 
admission to or exclusion or removal from the United States.”). 
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discrimination (as opposed to merely national origin discrimination) and hold that the 
relevant statutes and regulations provide for nondiscriminatory parole consideration.  
Such a determination would not be based on a phantom constitutional norm.163 
Although this Section has outlined several areas where constitutional challenges 
can be made in immigration cases, the plenary power doctrine is in a state of flux and no 
definitive statements can be made about its current scope.  Professor Legomsky’s 
prediction that the plenary power doctrine will wear away little by little is perhaps being 
realized.164 Based on the Court’s statement in Zadvydas that the government’s exercise 
of its immigration power is subject to “important constitutional limitations,” lower courts 
may increasingly be inclined to apply normal constitutional rules in immigration cases.165 
Even if the plenary power doctrine is not further weakened, however, there are several 
major areas in immigration law where application of the avoidance canon is legitimate 
and appropriate and does not require the use of phantom constitutional norms. 
IV. A New Concern: The Lowest Common Denominator Principle 
 
While the Court’s use of the avoidance canon was notable in the past because the 
canon was sometimes applied to avoid constitutional issues that were not serious, the 
Court’s recent use of the canon is notable for another reason.  The Court’s recent decision 
in Clark v. Martinez166 has added a new and powerful aspect to the avoidance canon by 
directing that a statutory interpretation made by invoking the canon be uniformly applied 
 
162 See Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 974 n.29 (9th Cir. 2004). 
163 In addition, Jean involved actions by the Executive Branch, rather than a classification made by 
Congress, which may be relevant in deciding the case.  See supra note 124 and accompanying text.    
164 See Legomsky, supra note 115, at 934. 
165 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).  The Court’s decision in Demore v. Kim would be an obvious barrier to such 
a holding, though.  See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. 
166 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
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in subsequent cases even when the later cases do not raise any constitutional issues.167 
The Court’s creation of what it terms the “lowest common denominator” principle is new 
in the sense that courts in the past have often interpreted the same statutory language in 
different ways depending on the status of the litigant before the court.168 
Although the lowest common denominator principle is related to the phantom 
constitutional norms problem, the two issues should not be confused.169 The lowest 
common denominator principle is not specific to immigration law.  In the Court’s view, it 
is a legitimate and necessary consequence of the application of the avoidance canon and, 
consequently, is present even when the issue avoided is genuine.170 Indeed, the Court’s 
purpose in creating the lowest common denominator principle likely was not an effort to 
protect aliens.  Professor Siegel has theorized that the lowest common denominator 
principle was adopted by the author of the Martinez decision, Justice Scalia, in an attempt 
to limit the judicial discretion that would be inherent in allowing judges to choose 
different interpretations for the same statutory language.171 Thus, unlike the phantom 
constitutional norms problem, the issues raised by the creation of the lowest common 
denominator principle are particularly relevant to immigration law but extent beyond it. 
 
167 See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. 
168 See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 339, 340 (2005). 
169 See supra Part III (discussing the problem of phantom constitutional norms).  In his article, Professor 
Motomura did argue that using canons to protect constitutional interests could cause overbreadth in the 
sense that the statutory protections could be broader than the protections offered by constitutional 
decisions.  Professor Motomura was referring to the immigration rule of lenity, not the lowest common 
denominator principle, however.  See Motomura, supra note 4, at 601.  As described in Part I.A., the 
immigration rule of lenity is not an example of overbreadth because the canon is designed to be applied in 
cases of ambiguity, without regard to whether constitutional issues are raised.      
170 Because the Court considers the lowest common denominator principle to be part of the legitimate 
application of the avoidance canon, the issue is technically not one of overutilization, unlike a phantom 
norms decision where the avoidance canon is applied despite the trigger for application of the canon 
(serious constitutional issues) not having been met.   
171 See Siegel, supra note 168, at 370-77. 
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This Part illustrates how the lowest common denominator principle can create 
greater rights for aliens as a whole, at least temporarily, than if the provision in question 
had been struck down on constitutional grounds.  This Part also argues that the power of 
the lowest common denominator principle warrants caution by courts when they apply 
the avoidance canon.  Courts must be particularly diligent in ensuring that the 
constitutional issues are serious and the interpretation adopted is plausible, even if 
second-best.   
 A. Statutory Decisions That Give Aliens More Rights Than  
 Constitutional Decisions 
 
1. Zadvydas v. Davis and Clark v. Martinez 
The creation of the lowest common denominator principle in immigration law 
started with the Court’s decision in Zadvydas.172 Recall that in Zadvydas, the Court 
applied the avoidance canon in interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which states that 
certain aliens “may be detained beyond the [90 day] removal period . . . .”173 The Court, 
required by the canon to adopt a "fairly possible" interpretation of the statue that would 
avoid the constitutional questions raised by the detention of aliens who legally are 
considered to have entered the country, held that these aliens can only be detained for a 
six month period unless there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 
foreseeable future.”174 Thus, as a result of the Court’s use of the avoidance canon, the 
holding was one of statutory construction that was driven by constitutional concerns.    
What is remarkable about the Zadvydas decision and its aftermath is that the 
statutory decision in Zadvydas likely resulted in greater rights for aliens as a whole, at 
 
172 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
173 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
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least temporarily, than if the decision had rested on constitutional grounds.  Prior to 1996, 
there were two classes of aliens, “excludables” and “deportables.”  As the Court stated in 
Zadvydas, the difference between the two classes rested “upon a basic territorial 
distinction."175 Excludable aliens, even ones who were physically present due to having 
been “paroled” into the country by the Attorney General, were considered under the 
“entry fiction” to be outside the United States and ineligible for admission or entry.176 
Deportable aliens, in contrast, were those who had "entered" into the country, legally or 
otherwise.177 Excludable aliens were considered to have little or no constitutional rights, 
while aliens who had entered the United States had greater constitutional rights.178 
On September 30, 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA, which changed the 
terminology.179 There are still separate grounds of "inadmissibility" and "deportability," 
but the difference between the two grounds now turns on whether an alien has been 
legally "admitted" to the United States, rather than on whether the alien has gained 
"entry," legal or otherwise.180 While there are still statutory differences between 
 
174 533 U.S. at 701. 
175 Id. at  694. 
176 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)(1994) (repealed 1996).  Like the plenary power doctrine, the “entry fiction” has 
long been harshly criticized, see, e.g., Hart, supra note 22, at 1389-96, but still retains constitutional 
significance.     
177 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1994) (repealed 1996); see Alvarez-Mendez v. INS, 941 F.2d 956, 961 n.4 (9th Cir. 
1991).  The importance of having entered the United States led to significant, and often bizarre, litigation 
regarding whether an alien could be deemed to have made an entry.  See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 
U.S. 449 (1963) (determining whether a return from a visit of a couple of hours in Mexico was an entry); 
Matter of Ching and Chen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 203, 206 (B.I.A. 1984) (determining whether aliens who had 
escaped from custody at LAX and captured two days later in Texas had entered).     
178 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (describing the different constitutional rights afforded 
the two groups of aliens). 
179 In IIRIRA, Congress substituted the term "inadmissible" for "excludable" wherever the latter term 
appeared in the INA.  IIRIRA § 308(d)(3)(A).  Congress also replaced the separate exclusion and 
deportation proceedings with a single “removal” proceeding.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 
180 See Ngo v. INS , 192 F.3d 390, 394 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1999).  Thus, unlike the old regime, some aliens who 
have entered the country are grouped, in the “inadmissible” category, with aliens who have not entered the 
country.  There continues to be significant statutory, as well as constitutional, distinctions between aliens 
who have gained "admission" or "entry" to the United States and those who have not.  See Aleinikoff, 
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inadmissible and deportable aliens, many of the provisions in the INA, including § 
1231(a)(6), now apply without differentiation to both classes. 
In contrast to a statute providing for the indefinite detention of deportable aliens, 
which the Court in Zadvydas indicated would at the least raise serious constitutional 
questions, a similar statute providing for the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens 
would likely be constitutional.181 In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,182 
which was explicitly not revisited by the Court in Zadvydas, the Court held that the 
indefinite detention of a returning permanent resident alien did not violate due process 
because the alien was treated "as if stopped at the border" and thus had no due process 
rights at all.183 Furthermore, lower courts have consistently held that provisions 
providing for the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens are constitutional.184 
If the Court in Zadvydas had interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) as giving the 
Attorney General the authority to detain aliens indefinitely but that the indefinite 
detention of deportable aliens was unconstitutional, the provision likely would have been 
left partially intact and could still have been applied to the detention of inadmissible 
aliens.  Facial challenges are disfavored by the Court, especially when the statute at issue 
can be applied constitutionally in some circumstances and has a severability clause.185 
supra note 131, at 375 (noting that the Court’s opinion in Zadvydas "reaffirm[s] the border/interior 
distinction as a constitutional matter”).   
181 In this Article, I use the terms “inadmissible” and “excludable” interchangeably.  In using the term 
inadmissible, I intend for it to be understood as synonymous with excludable, even if doing so is somewhat 
inaccurate, and to only include those aliens who are deemed under immigration law to have been stopped at 
the border.  See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 375 n.2 (2005) (treating the terms inadmissible and 
excludable as being equivalent).  
182 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
183 Id. at 215. 
184 See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.      
185 See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878-93 (2005).  
The Court has recognized that immigration provisions are to be severed when possible.  See INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983) (quoting language from the INA that “[i]f any particular provision of this Act, or 
the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the 
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Thus, the Court likely would have struck down the statute as applied but would have left 
the government with the ability to apply the statute to the detention of inadmissible 
aliens.  
The Court did not rule that § 1231(a)(6) is unconstitutional, though.  It interpreted 
the statute as not giving the Attorney General the authority to indefinitely detain 
deportable aliens.186 In Clark v. Martinez,187 the Court extended the Zadvydas statutory 
holding to include inadmissible aliens.  The Court held that § 1231(a)(6) should be 
interpreted as containing the same limitations as to the detention of inadmissible aliens as 
the Court in Zadvydas found were applicable to the detention of deportable aliens.188 The 
Court recognized that its interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas was driven by the 
avoidance canon.  The Court rejected the notion, however, that it needed to determine 
whether indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens would raise a serious constitutional 
question before it interpreted § 1231(a)(6) as not allowing for the indefinite detention of 
inadmissible aliens.189 Instead, the Court stated: 
It is not at all unusual to give a statute’s ambiguous language a limiting 
construction called for by one of the statute’s applications, even though 
other of the statute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the 
same limitation.  The lowest common denominator, as it were, must 
govern, . . . whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the 
particular litigant before the Court.190 
application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby”) (Emphasis 
added). 
186 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
187 543 U.S. 371 (2005).   
188 See id. at 377-78.  In dissent, Justice Thomas interpreted Zadvydas differently, arguing that “Zadvydas 
established a single and unchanging, if implausible, meaning of § 1231(a)(6): that the detention period 
authorized by § 1231(a)(6) depends not only on the circumstances surrounding a removal, but also on the 
type of alien ordered removed.”  Id. at 391 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
189 See id. at 380-81.  Significantly, the Court in Martinez did not claim that its interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas was the most persuasive interpretation available, only that the interpretation in 
Zadvydas must be applied uniformly to cases involving inadmissible aliens.  See supra Part II.A. 
(describing how the avoidance canon sometimes requires courts to adopt second-best interpretations).   
190 Id. at 724.  See also Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The government has offered no 
authority suggesting that a litigant may not take advantage of a statutory interpretation that was guided by 
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The end result of the Zadvydas decision has thus been very broad.  Before IIRIRA 
replaced the previous statutory regime with § 1231(a)(6), courts almost uniformly held 
that the Attorney General had both statutory and constitutional authority to indefinitely 
detain inadmissible aliens.191 After the passage of IRRIRA, courts held the same.192 
Even after the Zadvydas decision, some courts held that the Attorney General retained 
both statutory and constitutional authority to indefinitely detain inadmissible aliens.193 
Due to the Court’s use of the avoidance canon in Zadvydas and the lowest common 
denominator principle in Martinez, the Attorney General was precluded from detaining 
indefinitely not only deportable aliens, whose indefinite detention raises serious 
constitutional problems, but also inadmissible aliens, whose indefinite detention does not 
raise serious constitutional problems.  As a result, the Attorney General no longer had 
authority to detain even inadmissible aliens who had been ordered removed well before 
1996 and who had been subject to government detention procedures for over twenty 
years.194 
the principle of constitutional avoidance when that litigant’s case does not present the constitutional 
problem that prompted the statutory interpretation.”).   
191 See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the “overall 
structure” of the INA provisions relating to excludable aliens assumed that the Attorney General had 
authority to detain excludable aliens indefinitely); Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 
1448 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the indefinite detention of excludable aliens did not violate their 
substantive or procedural due process rights).  One major exception was the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2001), in which the court held that the indefinite 
detention of excludable aliens violated their due process rights. 
192 See, e.g., Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
193 See, e.g., Sierra v. Romaine, 347 F.3d 559 (3rd Cir. 2003) (holding that Zadvydas’s temporal limitation 
on detention does not apply to inadmissible aliens); Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding “that Zadvydas's six-month presumption of reasonableness is inapplicable to inadmissible 
aliens”).  The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the government no longer had statutory authority after 
Zadvydas to indefinitely detain inadmissible aliens.  See Xi v. INS, 298, 832, 837-39 (9th Cir. 2002). 
194 One of the aliens in Martinez arrived on the Mariel boatlift from Cuba in 1980 and was ordered removed 
in 1994.  543 U.S. 371, 374-75 (2005).  See also Benitez v. Wallis, 402 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2005) 
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2. INS v. St. Cyr and its Aftermath 
The potential for the avoidance canon to give aliens greater rights than a decision 
striking down the statutory provision in question as unconstitutional is not, of course, 
limited to detention cases.  The formula is simple.  A court interprets a statutory 
provision in favor of one group of aliens through an application of the avoidance canon.  
The Court then, pursuant to the lowest common denominator principle, uniformly applies 
the same interpretation in cases involving a second group of aliens even when the 
alternative interpretation favoring the government would not have raised any serious 
constitutional questions.195 
A similar phenomenon can also be found in St. Cyr and its aftermath.196 Recall 
that in St. Cyr the Court held that AEDPA and IIRIRA did not divest district courts of 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 over habeas corpus actions filed by criminal aliens to 
challenge their removal orders.197 In holding that habeas corpus review was still 
available for criminal aliens, the Court relied on the avoidance canon because an 
interpretation of the statutes “that would entirely preclude review of a pure question of 
law by any court would give rise to substantial constitutional questions.”198 The Court 
did not rely only on the avoidance canon, however.  The Court also cited the “strong 
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action” and “the longstanding 
 
(ordering the release of a Cuban national who came to the United States on the Mariel boatlift in 1980); 
Arango Marquez v. INS, 346 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).  
195 Of course, if the case involving the second group of aliens reaches court first, the court would apply the 
lowest common denominator based on constitutional concerns involving the first group of aliens.  See 
Martinez, 543 U.S. at 724.  Either way, the second group of aliens receives rights that it would not receive 
under a constitutional holding.  
196 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
197 Id. at 299.  I use the term “criminal aliens” to refer to aliens who are alleged by the government to be 
deportable on the basis of their criminal activities.  “Non-criminal” aliens are those who are alleged to be 
deportable on other than criminal grounds.    
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rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.199 
Significantly, the Court noted that “Congress could, without raising any constitutional 
questions, provide an adequate substitute through the courts of appeals.”200 Thus, even if 
the Court had held that the review provisions in AEDPA and IIRIRA unconstitutionally 
deprived criminal aliens of the ability to file habeas corpus petitions, the provisions 
would have been constitutional as applied to non-criminal aliens, who can obtain review 
of final orders of removal in the courts of appeals.201 
Subsequent to St. Cyr, and without benefit of the Court’s decision in Martinez,
some lower courts held that the Court’s decision in St. Cyr compelled a finding that non-
criminal aliens could challenge their removal orders through habeas corpus in district 
court even though they, unlike criminal aliens, were able to obtain judicial review 
through the review provisions set forth in the INA.  The Third Circuit in Chmakov v. 
Blackman202 made such a holding, explicitly refusing to adopt different interpretations of 
the same statutory provisions depending on the status of the alien.203 Similarly, the 
Second Circuit in Liu v. INS204 agreed with the Third Circuit that habeas jurisdiction was 
not repealed for non-criminal aliens, reasoning that “St. Cyr held as a matter of statutory 
construction that habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by AEDPA and 
 
198 Id. at 300; see also Neuman, supra note 101, at 1991 (describing the difficulties of resolving the 
Suspension Clause issue). 
199 533 U.S. at 298. 
200 See id. at 314 n.38.  See also id. at 314 (noting that “[i]f it were clear that the question of law could be 
answered in another judicial forum, it might be permissible to accept the INS’ reading” of the statute). 
201 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2006). 
202 266 F.3d 210 (3rd Cir. 2001). 
203 Id. at 215. 
204 293 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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IIRIRA.  The Court’s construction of those statutes, which does not distinguish, expressly 
or implicitly, between criminal and non-criminal aliens, compels our conclusion.”205 
B. The Significance of the Lowest Common Denominator 
 Principle in Immigration Law    
 
The decisions described above illustrate how second-best interpretations made 
through the avoidance canon can lead to greater rights for aliens as a whole, at least 
temporarily, than would a decision striking down the statute as unconstitutional on an as-
applied basis.  Because of the lowest common denominator principle, the avoidance 
canon has been transformed into an even more powerful tool for protecting aliens.206 
Indeed, the effects of the lowest common denominator principle are particularly strong in 
immigration law because of immigration law’s unique classifications.  It is still true that 
inadmissible and deportable aliens have very different constitutional rights.207 Yet, many 
immigration provisions, such as the one at issue in Zadvydas, are general in scope and 
apply to both deportable and inadmissible aliens.  In addition, immigration law makes 
other distinctions among aliens, such as the criminal, non-criminal distinction in St. 
 
205 Id. at 40.  See also Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with the Third Circuit and the 
Second Circuit that habeas jurisdiction was not repealed for non-criminal aliens).  Not all circuit courts 
agreed that the habeas route was still available to non-criminal aliens, however.  See, e.g., Lee v. Gonzales, 
410 F.3d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that habeas jurisdiction was not available when another avenue 
of review was available).  In his dissenting opinion in Martinez, Justice Thomas, pointing to the Chmakov,
Riley and Liu decisions, stated that “[t]he logic in allowing non-criminal aliens, who have a right to judicial 
review of removal decisions, to take advantage of constitutional doubt that arises from precluding any 
avenue of judicial review for criminal aliens . . . escapes me.”  See 543 U.S. 371, 401 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
206 It appears that lower courts have treated the lowest common denominator principle seriously.  See, e.g.,
Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076-78 (9th Cir. 2006) (interpreting a different set of detention 
provisions than the one at issue in Zadvydas to allow detention for only a limited time, even though the 
alien before the court had been stopped at the border, because deportable aliens were also subject to 
detention under the same provisions). 
207 See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text. 
47
Cyr.208 There are thus numerous potential opportunities for aliens, as a whole, to benefit 
from the lowest common denominator principle.209 
Despite the undeniable power of the lowest common denominator principle in 
immigration law, its significance in immigration cases should not be overstated.  
Professor Siegel argues that the lowest common denominator principle, when combined 
with the avoidance canon, “rachets up the judicial interference with congressional 
will.”210 This is true, however, only when a second canon in addition to the avoidance 
canon is not relevant to the interpretation of the statute.   
 Multiple canons are often implicated in immigration cases, and in such 
circumstances where a second canon is applicable in addition to the avoidance canon, the 
statutory provisions should be interpreted uniformly regardless of the lowest common 
denominator principle.  In cases that raise serious constitutional questions, the avoidance 
canon is implicated if the statutory interpretation favoring the alien is a fairly possible 
interpretation, while the immigration rule of lenity, for example, is implicated whenever 
an immigration statute is ambiguous.211 Thus, if an immigration provision is ambiguous 
and the government’s interpretation of it would raise a serious constitutional question, 
both canons direct courts to interpret the statute in favor of the alien, with the 
immigration rule of lenity being applicable regardless of any constitutional concerns.  
 
208 See supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text. 
209 I state that aliens “as a whole,” are benefited, but, to be more specific, the group likely to be assisted the 
most by the lowest common denominator principle are inadmissible aliens.  In many cases where a court 
avoids a constitutional claim brought by a deportable alien, it is still likely that the constitutional challenge 
would not have been a serious one if it had been made by an inadmissible alien.  Yet, under the lowest 
common denominator principle, the statutory provision must be interpreted uniformly.     
210 See Siegel, supra note 168, at 382.  See also Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen, 207 F.Supp.2d 326, 334 (D. N.J. 
2002) (arguing that the idea that a Supreme Court interpretation avoiding serious constitutional questions 
applies to every conceivable application of the statute would dramatically expand the power of the courts at 
the expense of Congress). 
211 See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (describing the immigration rule of lenity).   
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The presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action, the canon requiring 
a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction, and the Charming 
Betsy canon can also be applicable in cases that raise serious constitutional issues.212 
In Zadvydas, it is perhaps true that only the avoidance canon was relevant, 
although the Court did state that the statutory provision in question, 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(a)(6), was ambiguous.213 It is possible, however, that the statutory provision was 
sufficiently unclear that the avoidance canon could be applied but not so ambiguous that 
the immigration rule of lenity, a tie-breaker canon, would have been applied to the 
provision absent any constitutional concerns.214 In such a scenario, application of the 
lowest common denominator principle in Martinez could be viewed as truly aggressive.   
 The St. Cyr decision presents a clearer situation where more than one canon was 
applicable.  In St. Cyr, the Court applied the avoidance canon and interpreted the relevant 
provisions as not depriving courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction with regard to petitions 
filed by criminal aliens.215 Subsequent to St. Cyr, some lower courts interpreted the same 
provisions as not depriving courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction with regard to non-
criminal aliens, even though such an interpretation would have been constitutional.216 
Yet, in St. Cyr, unlike perhaps Zadvydas, another canon was relevant.  The Court in St. 
Cyr also cited the canon requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal 
 
212 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text (describing these canons).  The presumption against 
retroactivity is another canon frequently used in immigration cases, although it is not often relevant in cases 
where constitutional issues are raised.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that 
retroactive statutes are not unconstitutional). 
213 See supra note 89. 
214 See supra note 31 (comparing the degree of ambiguity required to trigger the avoidance canon and the 
immigration rule of lenity). 
215 See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text. 
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habeas jurisdiction.217 Thus, after St. Cyr, lower courts correctly recognized that even 
though the avoidance canon was not applicable, another canon was applicable and, 
independent of the lowest common denominator principle, required that the provision be 
interpreted in favor of non-criminal aliens.218 
Another reason why the significance of the lowest common denominator should 
not be overstated is that even when canons are used in an aggressive and unpredictable 
manner, judicial decisions applying canons are not as dangerous to congressional 
supremacy, at least in some respects, as judicial decisions that rest on constitutional 
grounds.219 When a court ignores congressional intent and aggressively interprets a 
statute in favor of an alien by applying the avoidance canon, and thus does not act as a 
“faithful agent” of Congress, it can still be said to act with restraint by not deciding the 
case on constitutional grounds.  Congress can overturn a court decision by amending a 
statute, but it cannot overturn a constitutional decision without amending the 
Constitution.220 Many immigration commentators believe this judicial restraint comes at 
a price, however.221 Because statutory decisions, as compared to constitutional decisions, 
 
217 In addition, the Court cited the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.”  
533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001). 
218 See Chmakov v. Blackman, 266 F.3d 210, 214 (2001) (noting that although there was no Suspension 
Clause problem because non-criminal aliens had another avenue of judicial review, the Court’s decision in 
St. Cyr also rested on the basis that there must be a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas 
jurisdiction).  Because of the applicability of a second canon, Justice Thomas was incorrect in his dissent in 
Martinez when he criticized lower courts for holding that habeas corpus jurisdiction still existed for non-
criminal aliens subsequent to the Court’s decision in St. Cyr. 543 U.S. at 401 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
219 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 341 (2000) (noting that canons do 
not create serious risks to the operation of the regulatory state because they only ensure congressional 
deliberation on issues of great sensitivity). 
220 When the Court applies the avoidance canon, however, Congress can interpret the decision as one that 
creates constitutional rights and may be wary of attempting to overturn it.  Lower courts may also interpret 
the decision as making a constitutional holding, even when doing so is not warranted.  See Motomura, 
supra note 4, at 611. 
221 See, e.g., Jose Javier Rodriguea, Recent Development, Clark v. Martinez: Limited Statutory 
Construction Required by Constitutional Avoidance Offers Fragile Protection for Inadmissible Immigrants 
From Indefinite Detention, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 518-19 (2005).     
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can be much more readily fixed by Congress, they do not result in permanent rights for 
aliens.222 
The recent legislation targeting judicial review and the resulting litigation 
illustrates both the limited nature of statutory decisions as protective devices for aliens 
and how statutory decisions can operate as a dialectic between the courts and 
Congress.223 In 1996, Congress passed IIRIRA and AEDPA, which purported to make 
significant changes to the judicial review provisions of the INA, almost all of which were 
hostile to aliens.224 Courts generally interpreted these provisions very narrowly, 
including the Court in St. Cyr when it saved habeas corpus jurisdiction for criminal 
aliens.225 In response to these decisions, Congress passed the REAL ID Act of 2005, 
generally eliminating from courts habeas corpus jurisdiction to review final orders of 
removal.226 Significantly, however, Congress removed many of the bars to judicial 
review in the federal courts of appeals that caused criminal aliens to file habeas corpus 
 
222 On the other hand, even if the plenary power doctrine were ended, as many immigration scholars desire, 
it is not clear how many more constitutional challenges to immigration statutes would be successful.  For 
example, it seems unlikely that the Court would ever view Congress’s power to regulate immigration as 
suspect and effectively mandate open borders or hold that aliens have a fundamental right to remain in the 
United States once they have entered, even if they have family members in the country.  See Kif Augustine-
Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 706 (2005).  Another 
critically important doctrine of immigration law that would be unaffected by an end to the plenary power 
doctrine is the longstanding principle that deportation is not punishment, which denies important 
protections that criminal defendants receive, such as a right to government appointed counsel and a jury 
trial and prohibitions on ex post facto laws and cruel and unusual punishment.  See Daniel Kanstroom, 
Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1889 (2000).  Thus, while constitutional decisions may result in permanent rights for 
aliens, the scope of the rights gained from such decisions will probably always be relatively limited.   
223 Earlier in this Article I used the REAL ID Act of 2005 to illustrate the way in which canons can add 
predictability to the law by acting as background rules that guide Congress when it chooses statutory 
language.  See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.   
224 See Neuman, supra note 101. 
225 See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. 
226 See Ishak v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing how the “Real ID Act amended 
section 242 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, to place review of all final removal orders, for both criminal and 
non-criminal aliens, in the courts of appeals”). 
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petitions in district courts in order to challenge their removal orders.227 The end result is 
that judicial review has largely been saved for criminal aliens, which was an open 
question after IIRIRA was passed in 1996.228 Thus, while the statutory decisions by 
courts did not result in permanent rights for aliens, the decisions led to a dialogue 
between the courts and Congress that ultimately resulted in both preserved rights for 
aliens and more precise legislation.229 
Although the effects of the lowest common denominator principle should not be 
overstated, it is important that the avoidance canon be applied carefully in immigration 
cases.  Justice Thomas complains that under the “lowest common denominator principle, 
a statute like § 1231(a)(6) must be narrowed once and for all based on constitutional 
concerns that may never materialize.”230 It should not seem surprising to Justice Thomas 
that constitutional issues that are avoided may end up being decided in favor of the 
government.  Aggressive (but plausible) statutory interpretations are part of the legitimate 
application of the avoidance canon, and the nature of the canon is such that the 
constitutional issues are avoided, not decided.231 Nevertheless, because of the lowest 
common denominator principle, an implausible statutory interpretation, as opposed to a 
plausible, second-best interpretation, seems even more aggressive if the constitutional 
issue is not one that would have been decided in favor of the alien. 
 
227 See Motomura, supra note 105, at 487. 
228 See id. at 463. 
229 See Elhauge, supra note 106, at 2210; Sunstein, supra note 219, at 331 (arguing that the presumption 
against retroactivity, along with other canons such as the avoidance canon, act as nondelegation canons that 
require sensitive issues (both constitutional and non-constitutional) to be deliberately and expressly 
addressed by Congress).          
230 Cf. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 397 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Of course, a statute cannot be “narrowed once 
and for all” by a court because Congress can always override the statutory decision.  See supra notes 103-
06 and accompanying text (describing the REAL ID Act). 
231 See supra Part II.A. (explaining that a legitimate aspect of the avoidance canon is the adoption of 
second-best statutory interpretations).     
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Another common complaint about the avoidance canon is that when a court 
chooses to avoid a constitutional question, it frequently also avoids the obligation of 
careful consideration and reason giving that typically accompanies constitutional 
adjudication.232 This criticism is particularly relevant to immigration law.  Considering 
their past history of using phantom constitutional norms when applying the avoidance 
canon, courts must be particularly careful in immigration cases to ensure that the 
constitutional issues to be avoided are indeed both real and serious.233 Especially in light 
of the lowest common denominator principle, decisions that are too aggressive risk 
unnecessarily disrupting Congress’s legislative designs rather than respecting Congress, 
which is one of the purposes of the avoidance canon.234 
V. The Legitimacy of the Canons of Statutory Construction Chosen 
 by the Supreme Court 
 
Thus far, this Article has accepted the Court’s choices about which canons to 
create and apply and has dealt with various issues regarding over- or under utilization of 
the canons it has chosen.  It is widely accepted that the application of some type of 
canons is inevitable because statutes frequently lack clarity, often because Congress is 
either unable or unwilling to legislate with clarity.235 Choosing which canons to create 
and apply is a more difficult issue, however.  In cases of statutory ambiguity, for 
example, courts have sometimes applied the immigration rule of lenity, which directs 
 
232 See Young, supra note 76, at 1574.  The Court itself acknowledged in Martinez that it does not engage 
in a full constitutional analysis when it applies the avoidance canon.  See 543 U.S at 381. 
233 Another common complaint about the avoidance canon is that it creates a "penumbra" effect which 
“actually broadens the impact of constitutional provisions beyond their legitimate warrant.”  See Young, 
supra note 76, at 1551.  Similar to the phantom norms danger, if courts are careful when describing the 
constitutional issues that they are avoiding, and careful to avoid only serious constitutional issues, the 
penumbra effect should be limited, even though the statutory interpretation may be a second-best 
interpretation.   
234 See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s view that application of the 
avoidance canon helps enact congressional intent). 
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courts to interpret ambiguities in immigration statutes in favor of aliens.236 But why 
should courts resolve statutory ambiguity in this manner?  Why should a court not instead 
apply an immigration rule of severity and interpret any ambiguities against aliens?             
 Although as “faithful agents” of Congress, courts often justify their statutory 
interpretations on the basis of congressional intent, many of the canons currently applied 
in immigration cases are hard to defend on the basis that their application helps enact 
congressional intent.  In fact, as this Part illustrates, it could be argued that some of the 
canons run counter to congressional intent.  Nevertheless, this reality does not make the 
canons chosen by courts illegitimate.  It cannot be doubted that all of the substantive 
canons to some degree reflect value choices made by judges.237 The goal of statutory 
interpretation may be primarily aimed at enforcing the intent of Congress, but an 
exclusive focus on congressional intent tends to obscure the fact that judicial discretion is 
inherent in statutory interpretation.  Many judges, while still striving to uphold 
congressional intent, desire to also promote other values.238 The values chosen by the 
Court to protect in immigration cases are worthy ones, especially compared to the values 
that would be promoted by alternative canons.  This Part thus defends the immigration 
canons that have been chosen by courts despite the fact that they do not always help enact 
congressional intent.   
235 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
236 See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (describing the immigration rule of lenity).    
237 See Solan, supra note 32, at 477 (arguing that the avoidance canon does not “substitute for intent” but 
rather “interact[s] with intent”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: 
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595-96 (1992) ("[S]ubstantive 
canons are not policy neutral. They represent value choices by the Court."). 
238 See generally Steven J. Cleveland, Judicial Discretion and Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV.
31 (2004); see also Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 
1404 (2005) (stating that “[w]hatever one’s school of thought, judicial judgment will always creep into the 
equation in some form”). 
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A. The Relevance of Congressional Intent  
 
When a statute is unclear, courts must decide whether the uncertainty is an 
invitation to courts to make policy choices, through the application of canons or 
otherwise, or, conversely, whether courts must attempt to adopt canons that will help 
enact probable congressional intent.239 The choice between policy and congressional 
intent may be a distinction without much of a difference, though.  As faithful agents, 
courts often justify the use of a canon on the basis that the application of it accurately 
helps to enact congressional intent.240 Resolving the issue of which canons can be said to 
reflect congressional intent is not easy, or perhaps even possible, however.241 
1. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and   
 Congressional Intent    
 
Consider the avoidance canon.242 In Martinez, Justice Scalia asserted that the 
canon is “a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting it.”243 The 
theory, resting on what Justice Scalia terms a “reasonable presumption,” is that Congress 
intends to legislate constitutionally and that Congress would thus prefer the statutory 
interpretation that does not raise constitutional doubts.244 Accordingly, because Congress 
 
239 See Nelson, supra note 31, at 394 (stating that “[u]nless interpreters are willing to hold statutes void for 
vagueness, they need some way to finish the job and to pick from among the possible meanings that their 
primary interpretive tools have identified”).  The choice for courts posed in the text assumes that the 
statutory ambiguity is not a delegation to agencies to make the policy choices, as envisioned in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  See generally Slocum, supra 
note 30 (describing how the immigration rule of lenity interacts with the Chevron doctrine). 
240 See Solan, supra note 32, at 430 (“courts frequently justify many of the canons of construction upon 
which textualists rely as good proxies for the intent of the legislature”).  But see Nelson, supra note 31, at 
386 (“Textualists hesitate to argue that the best test of a canon is whether its use will minimize the gap 
between what interpreters understand statutes to mean and what members of the enacting legislature 
intended them to mean.”).   
241 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 518 (stating that any attempt to ground canons in legislative intent 
encounters substantial conceptual and empirical difficulties).   
242 See supra Part I.B. (describing the avoidance canon). 
243 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005). 
244 See id. at 381; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (“Congress . . . legislates in light of 
constitutional limitations”); Note, Should the Supreme Court Presume that Congress Acts Constitutionally?  
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would not intend to overstep its constitutional boundaries, when a statute can reasonably 
be interpreted in two distinct ways, one of which raises a potential constitutional issue, 
the less problematic reading should prevail.   
Not everyone agrees that application of the avoidance canon enacts congressional 
intent, however.  Some have argued that the canon is hard to defend in terms of capturing 
Congress’s likely intent because “there is no particular reason to presume that members 
of Congress systematically try to avoid gray areas and to refrain from pushing their 
power to its limits.”245 The detention provision at issue in Zadvydas is a good example of 
a statute where it can be said that Congress did not intend to avoid a gray area and wanted 
to push its power to its constitutional limits.246 Professor Aleinikoff points out that 
Congress had no reason to know before Zadvydas that its detention authority was 
restrained by the Constitution.247 In addition, the detention provision at issue was 
enacted as part of a statute, IIRIRA, that was the “toughest immigration legislation 
adopted in half a century.”248 If an interpretation of the statute giving the government 
power to detain even deportable (as opposed to only inadmissible) aliens indefinitely was 
the interpretation most likely consistent with congressional intent, it could be concluded 
 
The Role of the Canon of Avoidance and Reliance on Early Legislative Practice in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1798, 1801 (2003) (noting that “[u]nder this rationale, the canon is a 
means of ferreting out congressional intent”).       
245 See Nelson, supra note 31, at 387; Elhauge, supra note 106, at 2199 n.117 (stating that the cannon 
cannot “generally be justified as reflecting likely legislative preferences”).  Many have argued that the 
canon is illegitimate.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial 
Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1405-06, 1409 (2002) (calling the avoidance canon “wholly 
illegitimate” and “a misuse of judicial power”); Kelley, supra note 78, at 871 (calling for the abandonment 
of the avoidance canon).       
246 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Zadvydas decision). 
247 See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 368 (arguing that there was “nothing to suggest that Congress would not 
have wanted persons deemed by the Attorney General to be dangerous to be held for as long as he or she 
thought appropriate”).  But see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (stating that the Court had “reason to 
believe . . . that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months”).  
248 Aleinikoff, supra note 131, at 368. 
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that the application of the canon was unwarranted.249 The application of the Zadvydas 
interpretation in Martinez to cases involving inadmissible aliens, who likely can 
constitutionally be indefinitely detained, could be said to only compound the mistake.250 
2. The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Congressional  
 Intent 
 
Similar to the avoidance canon, it is questionable whether the immigration rule of 
lenity helps to enact congressional intent.251 A possible theory that the canon helps enact 
likely congressional intent is that deportation is a severe measure and fair notice, 
reasonable reliance, and settled expectations (values that Congress would presumably 
endorse when the consequences of deportation are so great), dictate that ambiguities in 
immigration statutes be interpreted against the government, not the alien.252 Throughout 
much of the history of immigration law, however, it would be hard to argue that Congress 
intended that ambiguities in immigration statutes be construed in favor of aliens.  The 
federal government’s early restrictions on immigration were motivated by racial animus, 
and it was not until halfway through the twentieth century that racial restrictions were 
eliminated from the INA.253 Recent immigration legislation, while perhaps not driven by 
racial animus to the same extent, has been remarkably harsh.254 It could certainly be 
 
249 The Court itself did not argue that it was adopting the most persuasive interpretation of the statute.  See 
supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
250 See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s decision in Martinez). 
251 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 671, 678 (1999) (stating that the criminal rule of lenity is not invoked in order to “reflect [] legislative 
preferences”). 
252 These are values that are vindicated by the void for vagueness doctrine, which the Court has applied to 
deportation provisions.  See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123-24 (1967). 
253 See Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After "9/11?", 7 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 317-322 (2003); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law 
and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 525 (2000) (arguing that immigration law disproportionately affects persons of color). 
254 See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the 
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000). 
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argued that it is doubtful that the same Congress that enacts immigration laws that 
severely disadvantage aliens would intend that any ambiguities in these statutes be 
interpreted in favor of aliens. 
The reasoning that courts use when applying the immigration rule of lenity also 
indicates that these courts have not necessarily invoked the canon in order to enact 
congressional intent.  Indeed, concern for the political vulnerability of aliens probably 
motivated the Court in creating and applying the immigration rule of lenity more than a 
desire to enact probable congressional intent.255 When the Court created the canon, it 
stated that it was interpreting the relevant statute narrowly “because deportation is a 
drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile,” not because doing so 
would enact congressional intent. 256 The Court’s concern for the vulnerability of aliens 
is evident in other areas of the law.  While the Court has consistently upheld immigration 
statutes from constitutional attack, on many occasions the Supreme Court has called 
aliens a “discrete and insular minority” in striking down restrictions on aliens outside of 
immigration law.257 
255 See William N. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1032-33 
(1989) (explaining that the immigration rule of lenity is an effort to protect certain “discrete and insular 
minorities” or “Carolene groups”).  
256 Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10.  The Court has consistently recognized that deportation is a serious 
penalty that inflicts great hardship.  See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (stating 
that “[d]eportation is always a harsh measure . . . .”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) 
(“Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding it visits a great hardship on the individual 
and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.  That deportation is a 
penalty–at times a most serious one–cannot be doubted.”).   
257 See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 n.5 (1984) (striking down a state statute that barred a 
resident alien from becoming a notary public and stating that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 
‘discrete and insular’ minority . . . for whom . . .  heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate”) (quoting 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).  See also LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 417 (5th Cir. 
2005) (“Given the extent to which resident aliens are legally entrenched in American society, their inability 
to participate in the political process qualifies them as a prime example of a discrete and insular minority 
for whom [ ] heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”) (citation and quotations omitted). 
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3. The Presumption Against Retroactivity and   
 Congressional Intent 
 
Other canons are similarly difficult to defend on the basis that Congress would 
want them to be applied to immigration statutes.  The presumption against retroactivity 
may be premised on the idea members of Congress rarely intend to establish new 
substantive rules for past conduct.258 The Court has stated that "[b]ecause it accords with 
widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a presumption against 
retroactivity will generally coincide with legislative and public expectations.”259 
Whether the application of the presumption against retroactivity does in fact enact 
congressional intent in immigration cases is questionable.  First, it certainly cannot be 
said that Congress is at all reluctant to enact immigration laws with retroactive effect.260 
Second, like the immigration rule of lenity, the Court’s statements suggest that its goal in 
applying the presumption against retroactivity is fairness rather than an attempt to enact 
congressional intent.  In St. Cyr,261 for example, the Court noted that concerns about 
retroactive laws become more acute when they target an “unpopular group” and stated 
that “because noncitizens cannot vote, they are particularly vulnerable to adverse 
 
258 See Nelson, supra note 31, at 390.   
259 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 261, 272 (1994).  See also Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at 
Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L. J. 291, 349 (2003) 
(noting that the Court’s motivation for the presumption against retroactivity is the unfairness involved in 
retroactive legislation and concern for the rule of law). 
260 See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955) (holding that retroactive application of new 
grounds for deportation provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 did not violate Ex Post 
Facto Clause); Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2003) (provision repealing discretionary waivers of 
deportation did not have impermissible retroactive effect on aliens who had been convicted at trial for 
aggravated felonies prior to such repeal).  See also Nelson, supra note 31, at 390-91 (stating that courts 
sometimes will apply the presumption against retroactivity even under circumstances in which Congress 
has not traditionally shied away form retroactive effects or in which the particular Congress that enacted a 
statute was willing to accept those effects).      
261 533 U.S. 289 (2001).      
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legislation.”262 In fact, the Court noted and rejected the government’s skepticism that 
aliens are an unpopular group.263 
B. Canons as Background Rules Guiding Congress  
 As the above discussion illustrates, it is difficult to establish that any given canon 
enacts Congress’s subjective intent, to the extent that such a subjective intent even 
exists.264 Still, it is possible to argue that the canons applied in immigration cases still, in 
a way, enact congressional intent.  Several scholars, as well as Justice Scalia, have argued 
that certain canons capture congressional intent because Congress presumably has them 
in mind when it drafts a statute.265 This concept is evidenced by the REAL ID Act where 
in response to the Court’s decision in St. Cyr, which applied canons of construction in 
holding that Congress did not clearly repeal habeas corpus jurisdiction for criminal 
 
262 Id. at 315 & n.39 (citing Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: 
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1615, 1626 (2000)).  See also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 
266 (stating that “responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that [Congress] may be tempted to use 
retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals”); Dan Y. Coenen, 
The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1281, 1293 (2002) (noting that these passages in St. Cyr tie the immigration rule of lenity to the 
theory expressed in the Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938), that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” may “call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry”); Elhauge, supra note 106, at 2210 (interpreting St. Cyr as a judicial attempt to 
elevate the influence of a politically weak group). 
263 533 U.S. at 315 n.39.     
264 See Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1211 (1990) (“The fundamental fiction, one so broad as to escape 
being primarily legal at all, may be called the fiction of legal intent.”). 
265 Justice Scalia has stated that once rules of “strict construction” “have been long indulged, they acquire a 
sort of prescriptive validity, since the legislature presumably has them in mind when it chooses its language 
. . . .”  Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 
583 (1989/1990). Many others have also argued in favor of the background rules theory.  See, e.g., Molot, 
supra note 34, at 1319 (stating that there is value in having clear canons available to legislators when they 
draft statutes); Manning, supra note 32, at 436 n.57 (arguing that canons have value not because they 
capture the legislature’s subjective intent, but because they represent a subset of the mutually available 
background conventions that make communication possible); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 140 (2000) (“It is more important that judges select one answer and apply it 
consistently over time than that they select the right answer.”).  
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aliens, Congress passed the REAL ID Act which explicitly referenced 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
“or any other habeas corpus provision.”266 
Even if it cannot be assumed that Congress would want a canon, the immigration 
rule of lenity for example, to be applied to any given immigration statute, the 
immigration rule of lenity is an established canon that has been around for decades.267 
Congress, at least to some degree, is capable of precluding the use of canons.268 Thus, it 
can be argued that if the canon is well-established at the time a statute is enacted, its 
application by courts to the statute is legitimate without regard to whether the canon is an 
accurate measure of how members of Congress themselves understood the statute.269 
C. The Value of Canons in Promoting Important Public Values 
 in Immigration Law  
 
While attempts have been made, such as the background rules theory described 
above, to defend canons on the basis that they enact congressional intent, it cannot be 
doubted that all of the substantive canons applied in immigration cases are, at least to 
some degree, underpinned by values.270 Indeed, the discussion in Section A does not 
establish that the canons used in immigration cases help enact congressional intent, but it 
does illustrate that courts desire to promote other values.  A presumption in favor of
retroactivity, for example, might be a more accurate measure of congressional intent in 
 
266 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. 
267 Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, COMMON LAW COURTS IN A CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES 
FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, IN A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (questioning the legitimacy of substantive canons but stating that the criminal 
rule of lenity is “validated by sheer antiquity”). 
268 See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 2085 (2002). 
269 See Nelson, supra note 31, at 386.  Presumably, if the canons are clear and are consistently applied, they 
will ultimately help minimize the gap between the courts’ interpretations of statutes and the meanings 
intended by members of Congress.  See id. 
270 See supra note 237. 
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immigration cases than a presumption against retroactivity.271 Such a presumption, 
though, would run counter to the Court’s desire, exhibited in St. Cyr, to protect a 
vulnerable minority group from unfair legislation when doing so would not explicitly run 
counter to congressional intent.272 Similar reasons undoubtedly motivate the Court’s 
choice of other canons, such as the decision to apply the immigration rule of lenity 
instead of an immigration rule of severity.273 
The Court’s decision to select canons such as the presumption against 
retroactivity and the immigration rule of lenity instead of a presumption in favor of 
retroactivity and an immigration rule of severity can thus be defended on the theory that 
courts should promote important public values through the creation and application of 
canons.  One of these values, according to Professor Sunstein, is that “[i]n the face of 
ambiguity, courts should resolve interpretive doubts in favor of disadvantaged groups.”274 
Undoubtedly, while this theory finds support in at least some of the Court’s decisions, 
selecting canons on the basis of whether they favor disadvantaged groups would not 
appeal to all of the Justices, and the Court’s selection of canons does not have to rest on 
this basis.  For example, Justice Scalia’s support for the idea that well-established canons 
are legitimate because Congress has them in mind when it drafts a statute is closely 
 
271 See supra notes 258-63 and accompanying text. 
272 See id.
273 Undoubtedly, the Court has motivations for its selection of canons other than a desire to protect aliens.  
The Court purports to apply the avoidance canon, for example, because it believes doing so helps enact 
congressional intent.  See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.  The Court’s aggressive use of the 
canon in the past in order to protect aliens, however, reveals that is also sees the canon as accomplishing 
much more than merely showing respect for Congress. 
274 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L.Rev. 405, 483-84 
(1989) (pointing to the canon that ambiguities in statues should be interpreted in favor of Indian tribes as an 
example); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1256-58 (1990) 
(arguing that interpretive regimes should rest on “principles”).  Other scholars have also advocated that 
courts should promote public values through the application of canons.  See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 255, 
at 1032-34 (discussing how courts can interpret statutes to protect traditional “Carolene” groups); Daniel B. 
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connected to the theory that the judiciary should promote values associated with stability 
in the law, which is usually achieved by interpreting statutes narrowly.  Professor 
Shapiro, for example, has argued that the application by courts of canons such as the 
presumption against retroactivity and the criminal rule of lenity helps to promote values 
such as predictability and continuity in statutory interpretation.275 
Even dynamic statutory interpretation theories that seek to interpret statutes in 
light of their present societal, political, and legal context can be used in support of the 
canons that the Court has chosen to apply in immigration cases.276 Professor Elhauge, for 
example, has suggested that ambiguous statutes be resolved by default rules that favor 
political satisfaction at the time the judicial decision is made, but if the court is unable to 
determine legislative preferences, it should adopt a construction aimed at spurring the 
legislature to take up and resolve the otherwise indeterminate statutory question.277 In 
Professor Elhauge’s view, the avoidance canon, the immigration rule of lenity, and the 
presumption against retroactivity can all be defended on this basis.278 
Regardless of the theory used to defend the canons chosen by the Court, the 
careful application of canons by courts in immigration cases is part of the legitimate, 
 
Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and its Consequences,
45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 768 (1992).     
275 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 943-
44, 960 (1992) (suggesting that the canons used by the Supreme Court reflect a preference for continuity).  
See also Tyler, supra note 238, at 1419, 1426 (arguing that canons such as the presumption against 
retroactivity help advance predictability and continuity in statutory interpretation; values which should be 
promoted rather than current democratic preferences or prevailing social norms); Nelson, supra note 31, at 
391 (noting that textualists argue that canons can encourage predictability in the law).   
276 See e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) 
(contending that statutes should “be interpreted ‘dynamically,’ that is, in light of their present societal, 
political, and legal context”).    
277 See Elhauge, supra note 106; Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002).   
278 See Elhauge, supra note 106, at 2210, 2270-72. 
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appropriate and historical use of canons by courts generally.279 All of the canons 
discussed in this Article serve important functions in helping judges resolve statutory 
uncertainty in a way that promotes sound public policy and protects vulnerable aliens.  
The benefits of abandoning the guidance of well-established canons such as the 
immigration rule of lenity or the presumption against retroactivity on the ground that they 
are not useful in interpreting statutes are dubious, while the benefits of retaining such 
canons are numerous.280 Moreover, changing canons would undermine, at least 
termporarily, the value and stability of canons as background rules guiding Congress and 
would create difficult issues such as whether the new canons should be applied 
retroactively to statutes passed before their creation.281 
The canons currently applied in immigration cases are not, of course, universally 
celebrated by scholars and courts.  Some canons, particularly the avoidance canon, have 
been subjected to harsh criticism and calls for their abolishment.282 Nevertheless, the 
beauty of these canons is a matter of taste.  Whether one sees the canons currently 
applied as legitimate devices for courts to use when interpreting statutes, or illegitimate 
usurpations of policy-making authority by courts, is a function of one’s jurisprudential 
philosophy.  One crucial point that cannot be debated, though, is that the Court approves 
 
279 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in 
Statutory Interpretation, 1176-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1021-25, 1103 (2001) (showing that an 
early understanding of judicial power in the United States included an approval of canons of statutory 
construction). 
280 Cf. Nelson, supra note 31, at 391 (stating that “the errors caused by refusing the guidance of specific 
canons may well outnumber the errors generated by the oversimplifications that such canons inevitably 
make”).           
281 Cf. Robert W. Scheef, Temporal Dynamics in Statutory Interpretation: Courts, Congress, and the 
Canon of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 529, 544 (2003) (arguing that the Court’s use of 
the avoidance canon fails to take into account the temporal dynamic involved when the constitutional rule 
that raises the problem was established after the enactment of the statute in question). 
282 See supra note 245.    
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of the use of the canons described in this Article and shows no signs of abandoning their 
use any time soon.   
CONCLUSION 
 Substantive canons of statutory interpretation occupy an important place in the 
law.  In immigration cases, they are especially significant because they usually direct 
courts to interpret statutes in favor of aliens and have the potential, through the 
application of the avoidance canon, of giving aliens as a whole greater rights, even if 
sometimes only temporarily, than would a decision on constitutional grounds.  Despite 
their importance, the role of canons in immigration law has largely been either ignored or 
impugned by the academy.  Unfortunately, the role of canons will never receive the 
attention lavished on the plenary power doctrine because statutory decisions do not result 
in permanent rights for aliens.  In addition, canons will always be the subject of criticism 
because they do not always help enact congressional intent and are both over- and 
underutilized by courts.  Yet, considering the relative lack of constitutional rights 
afforded aliens, canons are especially important devices in protecting this vulnerable part 
of the population.  When used properly, the application of canons in immigration cases 
adds predictability to the law and helps to promote important public values, a 
phenomenon sorely lacking elsewhere in immigration law. 
 
